[MLS] Reuse guard in Framing

Tijana Klimovic <tijana.klimovic97@gmail.com> Thu, 22 July 2021 09:58 UTC

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From: Tijana Klimovic <tijana.klimovic97@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2021 11:58:00 +0200
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Subject: [MLS] Reuse guard in Framing
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Hello,

I have a question regarding the reuse guard used in the framing. The
specification motivates its use in the following way:

"Before use in the encryption operation, the nonce is XORed with a fresh
random value to guard against reuse. Because the key schedule generates
nonces deterministically, a client must keep a persistent state as to where
in the key schedule it is; if this persistent state is lost or corrupted, a
client might reuse a generation that has already been used, causing reuse
of a key/nonce pair."

When would losing one's state be a realisitic possibility?

Many thanks.
Tijana