Re: [MMUSIC] Handling of unverified data and media

[Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]>]

Sorry, no, I was just talking about what might or might not be safe.... The
doc text is
a different question.

-Ekr


On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 4:05 PM, Bernard Aboba <[e-mail]>
wrote:

> EKR said:
>
> "I haven't spent too much time on it, but it seems like it ought to be
> safe to hold
> anything you receive prior to getting the fingerprint. It might be better,
> as MT
> suggests, to discard the datachannel data, but I'm not sure why it would be
> necessary."
>
> [BA] So you are saying that the MUST NOT allows the browser to buffer
> data/media but not to pass it to the application (in the case of the data
> channel) or to play it out?
>
> On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 4:01 PM, Eric Rescorla <[e-mail]> wrote:
>
>> I haven't spent too much time on it, but it seems like it ought to be
>> safe to hold
>> anything you receive prior to getting the fingerprint. It might be
>> better, as MT
>> suggests, to discard the datachannel data, but I'm not sure why it would
>> be
>> necessary.
>>
>> -Ekr
>>
>> On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 2:47 PM, Roman Shpount <[e-mail]> wrote:
>>
>>> My assumption always was that data is received, decoded and discarded
>>> until fingerprint is received and verified. This way DTLS handshake
>>> completes, key frames are decoded, but user is nor presented with any
>>> unverified media.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> _____________
>>> Roman Shpount
>>>
>>> On Thu, Mar 9, 2017 at 6:58 PM, Martin Thomson <[e-mail]
>>> > wrote:
>>>
>>>> I think that the data channel question is easy, anything other than a
>>>> "no" is not acceptable.  Data in that form enters the security
>>>> boundary for an origin and it doesn't make any sense to risk attack
>>>> there.  (It's also likely unnecessary, if a half a round trip of
>>>> signaling is slower than 5 round trips on the media path, then
>>>> something is messed up.)
>>>>
>>>> I'm in two minds about the media part. For media, you could also
>>>> reasonably make the same origin-purity argument.  I'm inclined to say
>>>> that.  But we CAN isolate media from the origin (and we definitely
>>>> should if we allow this).
>>>>
>>>> So, the media that arrives had to comply with your offer.  The DTLS
>>>> handshake also has to complete, which tells the receiver whether the
>>>> media needs to be confidential or not (at which point you can disable
>>>> this feature).
>>>>
>>>> It's also possible that a receiver can require that an ICE
>>>> connectivity check was made (though this is inbound only, and I'm
>>>> unclear on whether having received an inbound check would normally
>>>> prevent the receiver from accepting a packet).
>>>>
>>>> All told, that's a lot of information about the negotiated session for
>>>> an attacker to have.  The odds of this being an attack would *seem* to
>>>> be low.
>>>>
>>>> On the other hand, we don't assume confidentiality of signaling; the
>>>> security model assumes that all this information is effectively public
>>>> and the protection we have against attack is the certificate
>>>> fingerprint.  This would remove that protection, albeit for a short
>>>> duration.
>>>>
>>>> I have an extra question: does anyone plan to implement this?  It's
>>>> non-trivial.  I think that I know what I'd need to do in Firefox and
>>>> it would be quite disruptive.  Before committing to do that work
>>>> (which I will leave to others closer to this to decide), I'd probably
>>>> want more information on the actual advantage that it provides.
>>>>
>>>> On 10 March 2017 at 07:10, Bernard Aboba <[e-mail]>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> > In the W3C WEBRTC WG, an issue has been submitted relating to playout
>>>> of
>>>> > unverified media:
>>>> > https://github.com/w3c/webrtc-pc/issues/849
>>>> >
>>>> > It has been suggested that if the browser is configured to do so, that
>>>> > playout be allowed for a limited period (e.g. 5 seconds) prior to
>>>> > fingerprint verification:
>>>> > https://github.com/w3c/webrtc-pc/pull/1026
>>>> >
>>>> > Section 6.2 of draft-ietf-mmusic-4572-update-13 contains the
>>>> following text,
>>>> > carried over from RFC 4572:
>>>> >
>>>> >    Note that when the offer/answer model is being used, it is possible
>>>> >    for a media connection to outrace the answer back to the offerer.
>>>> >    Thus, if the offerer has offered a 'setup:passive' or
>>>> 'setup:actpass'
>>>> >    role, it MUST (as specified in RFC 4145 [7]) begin listening for an
>>>> >    incoming connection as soon as it sends its offer.  However, it
>>>> MUST
>>>> >    NOT assume that the data transmitted over the TLS connection is
>>>> valid
>>>> >    until it has received a matching fingerprint in an SDP answer.  If
>>>> >    the fingerprint, once it arrives, does not match the client's
>>>> >    certificate, the server endpoint MUST terminate the media
>>>> connection
>>>> >    with a bad_certificate error, as stated in the previous paragraph.
>>>> >
>>>> > Given the outstanding issue relating to handling of unverified media,
>>>> the
>>>> > Chairs of the W3C WEBRTC WG would like to request clarification from
>>>> the
>>>> > IETF MMUSIC WG as to the meaning of the "MUST NOT" in the above
>>>> paragraph.
>>>> > In particular, what is it permitted for an implementation to do with
>>>> > received data and media prior to verification? For example:
>>>> >
>>>> >      1. May data received over the data channel be provided to the
>>>> > application prior to verification?
>>>> >          a. If the answer to the above is "no", may unverified
>>>> received data
>>>> > be delivered by the DTLS transport to SCTP, which may buffer it?
>>>> >      2. May received media be played out prior to verification?
>>>> >
>>>> > Bernard Aboba
>>>> > On behalf of the W3C WEBRTC WG
>>>> >
>>>> > _______________________________________________
>>>> > mmusic mailing list
>>>> > [e-mail]
>>>> > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mmusic
>>>> >
>>>>
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