Re: [MMUSIC] AD evaluation: draft-ietf-mmusic-latching-04

Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com> Thu, 03 April 2014 17:39 UTC

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From: Dan Wing <dwing@cisco.com>
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Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2014 10:39:46 -0700
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To: Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in>
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Cc: draft-ietf-mmusic-latching@tools.ietf.org, mmusic <mmusic@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [MMUSIC] AD evaluation: draft-ietf-mmusic-latching-04
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On Apr 3, 2014, at 10:28 AM, Alissa Cooper <alissa@cooperw.in> wrote:

> Hi Dan,
> 
> On 4/1/14 11:42 AM, "Dan Wing" <dwing@cisco.com> wrote:
>> 
>>>> The draft suggests use of SRTP for authenticating media which does
>>>> resolve the security issues (from a privacy/confidentiality
>>>> perspective). 
>>> 
>>> I was more concerned with the DoS aspect.
>> 
>> The DoS aspect of authenticating incoming SRTP packets to the SBC?
> 
> The DoS aspect that is described in the paragraph Emil quoted below.
> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
>>>> That's part of section 5:
>>>> 
>>>> Naturally, SRTP [RFC3711] would help mitigate such threats and should
>>>> be used independently of HNT.  For example, in cases where end-to-end
>>>> encryption is used it would still be possible for an attacker to
>>>> hijack a session despite the use of SRTP and perform a denial of
>>>> service attack.  However, media integrity would not be compromised.
>>>> 

Sorry, I read it again and I'm still not clear on the concern.  Could you restate or rephrase.


> 
>>> I think something like the following might capture the
>>> situation better:
>>> 
>>> OLD:
>>> Due to the security issues presented in Section 5, the latching
>>> mechanism
>>> is considered inappropriate for general use on the Internet unless all
>>> security considerations are taken into account and solved.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> NEW:
>>> Due to the security issues presented in Section 5, the latching
>>> mechanism
>>> is considered inappropriate for general use on the Internet, and in
>>> controlled environments unless all security considerations are taken
>>> into
>>> account and solved.
>> 
>> "General use on the Internet" and "in controlled environments" are 100%
>> of all networks, so perhaps simplifying to:
>> 
>> NEW:
>> Due to the security issues presented in Section 5, the latching
>> mechanism
>> is considered appropriate only when all security considerations are
>> taken into
>> account and solved.
> 
> I think the text in the -04 is preferable to this, as it is more specific.
> 
> I would be interested in others' thoughts on the text I proposed above.

Could we at least eliminate the double negatives ("inappropriate ... unless")?

-d


> 
> Thanks,
> Alissa
> 
>