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Re: [MMUSIC] Trickle, privacy and bogus addresses

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Thu, 14 March 2013 20:10 UTC

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Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2013 16:10:07 -0400
From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
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Subject: Re: [MMUSIC] Trickle, privacy and bogus addresses
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If we can maintain privacy without having to specify an intentionally 
bogus address, then I am strongly in support of avoiding this silliness 
also.

/a

On 3/14/13 16:00, Martin Thomson wrote:
> Someone proposed that we use 0.0.0.1:9 to signal "no candidates".
>
> I don't believe this to be necessary and would rather we don't go there at all.
>
> If privacy concerns do not prevent the sharing of addressing
> information, trickle can proceed with host candidates.  This is not a
> real concern.
>
> If privacy protection is paramount, pay the price and allocate a turn
> candidate prior to sending the offer or answer.  It's only the caller
> that is required to pay this cost, which is a little silly because the
> answerer is the most likely to want this sort of protection.
>
> Furthermore, in WebRTC, we have a candidate pool that would ensure
> that would allow us to prime the answerer in preparation for receiving
> an offer such that overall session setup would not take any longer.
> If anyone is unconvinced, I'm happy to walk through a proof of this.
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