Re: [Model-t] What is "real ends"

[Thomas Hardjono <[e-mail]>]

Thanks Mark — let me read that draft first.

— thomas —




________________________________________
From: Model-t [[e-mail]] on behalf of Mark O [Mark.O=[e-mail]]
Sent: Thursday, August 8, 2019 1:40 PM
To: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: [Model-t] What is "real ends"

> Can you explain further or give some examples of "real ends" ?

Thomas,

There is a recent draft, draft-mcfadden-smart-endpoint-taxonomy-for-cless-00, that attempts to categorise different types of endpoints. Different classes of endpoint may have very different threat landscapes - a server or a PC has a very different attack surface than an industrial sensor or a personal fitness tracker, but all could be consider to be "real ends".

The endpoint taxonomy draft is related to draft-taddei-smart-cless-introduction-01, which seeks to define the Capabilities and Limitations of Endpoint-only Security Solutions. There are sections in this draft which describe various actual attacks and how they have been detected. Some of this content would be highly relevant to the discussion of a revised Internet threat model.

-- Mark


Thomas Hardjono <[e-mail]> wrote:


Jari,

Section 4 of draft-arkko-arch-internet-threat-model-01 talks about "real ends":


   But the details matter.  What is considered an endpoint?  What
   characteristics of Internet are we trying to optimize?  This memo
   makes the argument that, for security purposes, there is a
   significant distinction between actual endpoints from a user's
   interaction perspective (e.g., another user) and from a system
   perspective (e.g., a third party relaying a message).

   This memo proposes to focus on the distinction between "real ends"
   and other endpoints to guide the development of protocols.  A
   conversation between one "real end" to another "real end" has
   necessarily different security needs than a conversation between,
   say, one of the "real ends" and a component in a larger system.  The
   end-to-end argument is used primarily for the design of one protocol.
   The security of the system, however, depends on the entire system and
   potentially multiple storage, compute, and communication protocol
   aspects.  All have to work properly together to obtain security.


Can you explain further or give some examples of "real ends" ?


Thanks.

-- thomas --





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