Re: [Model-t] Model-t Perspective and Method Questions

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hi Ali,

Sorry for the slow response, I had a bunch of travels...

On 23/10/2019 15:42, Rezaki, Ali (Nokia - DE) wrote:
> If this perspective would make sense, would it be helpful then to
> initially work on:
> 
> 1. Examples of attacks that exploited vulnerabilities in IETF
> protocols that could not have been prevented by the current threat
> model in BCP 72, and in what way the threat model in BCP 72 could be
> modified to address these vulnerabilities?

I think that'd be really useful. I'd say documenting those
however you find easiest would be fine - no need to worry
about stuff being in Internet drafts for now anyway.

If doing that you might also want to note cases where the
vulnerability was in the implementation or deployment but
where (perhaps) some change to IETF protocols might have
made exploitation harder. I guess heartbleed might be the
canonical example there: had the TLS hearbeat response
been e.g. a hash of the request then the implementation flaw
might not have been near as bad, and IIRC we nearly did
(but didn't quite) stumble on that change in IESG discussion
of what became RFC6520, so I feel a little responsible
myself for not spotting that then;-(

> 2. Requesting information from related IETF contributors about a map
> of areas that IETF considers to be in scope for its work, and its
> evolution over the years, also identifying the underlying
> principles?

Not as sure about that one - I suspect it could be a major
time sink for you and it might be hard to get people to help
you get it done.

Hope that helps,
S.