Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect
Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com> Wed, 07 August 2019 00:24 UTC
Return-Path: <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
X-Original-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: model-t@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 904071200B2 for <model-t@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:24:46 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.997
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.997 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, FREEMAIL_FROM=0.001, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id kdIs4VpVNSqm for <model-t@ietfa.amsl.com>; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:24:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from mail-yw1-xc34.google.com (mail-yw1-xc34.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::c34]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 89AA91200B1 for <model-t@iab.org>; Tue, 6 Aug 2019 17:24:43 -0700 (PDT)
Received: by mail-yw1-xc34.google.com with SMTP id q128so31568219ywc.1 for <model-t@iab.org>; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 17:24:43 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date:message-id:subject:to :cc; bh=1c/rDqnIkgYGzY3mG6NTrscPysWA8n0W4ZcfLbr6k/o=; b=nHySiKKpmiJha7rfxClc3wNio9Y+msgUYrO1x3N8i3x2EYOSdgwv38kbhHpKOjzsG4 JoUqmQUF4/hHWTT55JG4mDJXMGAsYTbpoo/I+L8yUeHboliiQifpAkLN2RVuVQ66I1cb foG8IZY3H/oCAuJMv95WE26IYvmH/5MZkVt8DA7GYI7z/5CKazBxvEKkJddh8IobNgF8 IYuheQPWG6rIvDSsUYxIYEM7qubSPigdbezJ8+87OWUgWC2oLhXNeH3e6uhjlMM4B8MQ zjRONzOYm1/tZugtKn8d3yrC3b22D77rSKsKYxmbMonI+cf5bC0bMi56egidOKzUAM66 2eVA==
X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:references:in-reply-to:from:date :message-id:subject:to:cc; bh=1c/rDqnIkgYGzY3mG6NTrscPysWA8n0W4ZcfLbr6k/o=; b=GDuxvNGbdsIfmmXtkjZxRZGpxGRX9OUK0X4UAdUnTGMSOEv52D+RwYXvwiL579YSKe ehBudVcYcUvSoXvQHL3uF72J89673fmiUgYxNQwONrJ+K2xQRegJxZ/vSpdFbsLSa9Xf pIY4LLkeaVUR2VnFYeNlgti54NkyLJru2A5DzIzd/XDzejzhJp0YxGCRwOQGbfqVL53O BLe08H2f31RuEFZoqBUlLSn13kwh+hDg5kYC65CoG0F1MYJxd40OHzj4aT9nxN4c14C8 Lh91fJ1cia93xRhUHw9qiPmvNUFf+qAi/vsWjHurtQOej0TGeujDb1zWTYUkqQFjB2yK U5Vw==
X-Gm-Message-State: APjAAAU3UbM97FkntB+BzjMLSX0bNEC5Turj2plqn0j8lrrhgyr6nZMN JVpe2wSUIJn+UtToNuwEcmK/m2nDKoP04qR3FBg=
X-Google-Smtp-Source: APXvYqypoAD+ScYdosXoayyFnJ00cWJK9+FegLLooSzJeyILsf/xCK3yrFCCMcMpHstttTDIMLoQIfWT2QKAQsng7sY=
X-Received: by 2002:a81:1a4c:: with SMTP id a73mr3934692ywa.352.1565137482767; Tue, 06 Aug 2019 17:24:42 -0700 (PDT)
MIME-Version: 1.0
References: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu>
In-Reply-To: <4a2324dfd4ba4780a18bcb3f3db7f7de@oc11expo23.exchange.mit.edu>
From: Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Date: Tue, 06 Aug 2019 20:27:38 -0400
Message-ID: <CAN40gSsibQDrs8yDUYP59U+ume-MMwUpiQ_q0F6t27vQEOt+qw@mail.gmail.com>
To: Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu>, Ira McDonald <blueroofmusic@gmail.com>
Cc: "model-t@iab.org" <model-t@iab.org>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="000000000000af6355058f7bf790"
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/model-t/mtC9aPP9UAIxifNwQgR8vJtA2k0>
Subject: Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect
X-BeenThere: model-t@iab.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: Discussions of changes in Internet deployment patterns and their impact on the Internet threat model <model-t.iab.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.iab.org/mailman/options/model-t>, <mailto:model-t-request@iab.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/model-t/>
List-Post: <mailto:model-t@iab.org>
List-Help: <mailto:model-t-request@iab.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t>, <mailto:model-t-request@iab.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 07 Aug 2019 00:24:47 -0000
Hi, I disagree with this characterization of the IETF's historic interest. IETF NEA (built on contributed TCG TNC protocols) is *all* about the security and health of endpoints. And IETF NEA is now being leveraged heavily in IETF SACM for that very reason. SACM is of course *mostly* about the security and health of endpoints and only incidentally about middleboxes. Cheers, - Ira Ira McDonald (Musician / Software Architect) Co-Chair - TCG Trusted Mobility Solutions WG Co-Chair - TCG Metadata Access Protocol SG Chair - Linux Foundation Open Printing WG Secretary - IEEE-ISTO Printer Working Group Co-Chair - IEEE-ISTO PWG Internet Printing Protocol WG IETF Designated Expert - IPP & Printer MIB Blue Roof Music / High North Inc http://sites.google.com/site/blueroofmusic http://sites.google.com/site/highnorthinc mailto: blueroofmusic@gmail.com PO Box 221 Grand Marais, MI 49839 906-494-2434 On Tue, Aug 6, 2019 at 5:45 PM Thomas Hardjono <hardjono@mit.edu> wrote: > > >>> 1) Attacking the system directly. > > >>> 2) Delivering an attack through a user-initiated session or > exfiltrating data through said session > > >>> 4) Passive monitoring of all traffic > > >>> 5) Monitoring and tracking all user's traffic inside their session. > > > Historically the IETF has focused on protocols and communications > security. This was an explicit choice/decision of the IETF community in the > mid-1990s. So, all the protocols we have (ISAKMP, IKE, IPsec, TLS, etc.) > have addressed a threat model that was focused on the communications > channel. The security of the end-point, such as a Client or device, was out > of scope (until now, I guess, depending). > > If the IETF’s scope is going to be expanded, I’d suggest the IETF > developing an abstraction model and terminology that helps discussion. > Otherwise we end up boiling the ocean with too many words, use-cases and > scenarios. > > At the Montreal SAAG meeting I mentioned the term end-point “state”. One > way to map the above list of threats would be to express it abstractly in > terms of state and the protection of state information/data. So, the above > list could be mapped to something like this: > > (i) Unauthorized modification of end-point state. (i.e. attacking a client > OS.). > > (ii) Unauthorized exfiltration of end-point state information (i.e. > exfiltration of data, both system-data and user-data, from a machine). > > (iii) Malicious substitution of state in transit (i.e. hi-jacking a > connection and doing a MITM). > > (iv) Unhindered reporting of end-point state information (i.e. authentic > reporting from a MIB in a device). > > > You get my point. It’s no longer just about protection of the > communication channel and transport protocol resiliency. It’s now about > the “stuff” at the end of the channel. > > > — thomas — > > -- > Model-t mailing list > Model-t@iab.org > https://www.iab.org/mailman/listinfo/model-t >
- [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Michael Richardson
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Joseph Lorenzo Hall
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Michael Richardson
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Martin Thomson
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Jim Fenton
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Ted Lemon
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Christian Huitema
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Watson Ladd
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Carsten Bormann
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Ted Lemon
- [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] model-t@iab.org list description Watson Ladd
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Dominique Lazanski
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Dominique Lazanski
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Eric Rescorla
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Watson Ladd
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Ted Lemon
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Dominique Lazanski
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Ted Lemon
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Stephen Farrell
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Christian Huitema
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Ted Lemon
- [Model-t] Primer Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Christian Huitema
- Re: [Model-t] Primer Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Bret Jordan
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Watson Ladd
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Thomas Hardjono
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Ira McDonald
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Thomas Hardjono
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Watson Ladd
- Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect Thomas Hardjono