Re: [Model-t] What are we trying to protect

[Stephen Farrell <[e-mail]>]

Hiya,

On 04/08/2019 06:08, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> his seems like a reasonable problem statement for the overall problem of
> computer security, but not really for IETF.
> 
> To take a concrete example memory reading attacks like Spectre are a threat
> to user data and something that browser vendors spend a fair amount of
> energy working on, but they're mostly not in scope for IETF [0]. There's
> nothing wrong with that, it's just division of labor.

I tend to agree.

OTOH, one might also wonder if such attacks are or ought be
considered in NFV and similar things. Such wonderings could
I think be useful, even if the answer is maybe that without
the flexibility of JS a successful attack in such a scenario
seems unlikely enough to not have to (currently) bother with.
(That said, I've not really considered it in any detail so
maybe these attacks are more relevant for NFV and co than
I might think - anyone know?)

A bit later...

On 04/08/2019 10:09, Eric Rescorla wrote:
> - Compromise of the WebPKI would obviously be very bad
> for many protocols the IETF has designed, but the management
> of the WebPKI is done by CABF, not IETF.

That's also true, but nonetheless the IETF did document CT
as a direct result of the WebPKI CAs doing a bad job wrt
mis-issuance risks. So while "replace CABF, because <X>"
would not be a sensible outcome of this discussion, it's
reasonable to not consider the current WebPKI as a fixed
unchangeable thing, for the purposes of this discussion.
Now, as it happens, I don't think we're likely to need to
delve much into CABF's space (or the RPKI operators
similarly) in this discussion, except maybe if we're
considering when or how new PKIs might or might not be a
good idea.

S.