Re: [mpls] [MPLS] HELP: Need your opinion on LDP security

["Mallette, Edwin" <[e-mail]>]

Vero,

I cannot think of a case where I would utilize a different key to secure the hellos than the key used to secure the TCP session.  That being said, I also cannot think of a specific reason to preclude this functionality.

Ed

From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]] On Behalf Of Vero Zheng
Sent: Monday, October 25, 2010 12:11 AM
To: mpls
Subject: [mpls] [MPLS] HELP: Need your opinion on LDP security

Hi Folks,

We would like to hear you opinion on LDP security.

Unlike all other LDP messages, the Hello messages are sent using UDP not TCP.
This means that they cannot benefit from the security mechanisms available with TCP.
[RFC5036] does not provide any security mechanisms for use with Hello messages except to note that some configuration may help protect against bogus discovery events.

Do we need to allow the use of different keys from the ones used on the TCP session?

We have submitted a new "LDP Hello Cryptographic Authentication" draft. In this draft, we introduce a new Cryptographic Authentication TLV which is used in LDP Hello message as an optional parameter.
An LSR can be configured to only accept Hello messages from specific peers when authentication is in use.
The URL for it is: http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-zheng-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth-00.txt
Looking forward to your comments.

BR,
Mach and Vero

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