Re: [mpls] Ben's Comments on draft-ietf-mpls-sr-over-ip

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Sat, 20 April 2019 06:21 UTC

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Date: Sat, 20 Apr 2019 01:21:41 -0500
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
Cc: mpls@ietf.org, draft-ietf-mpls-sr-over-ip@ietf.org, "'The IESG'" <iesg@ietf.org>
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Subject: Re: [mpls] Ben's Comments on draft-ietf-mpls-sr-over-ip
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Hi Adrian,

On Sat, Apr 13, 2019 at 08:50:07PM +0100, Adrian Farrel wrote:
> Hi Ben,
> 
> Thanks for your very detailed comments on this draft. Quite a lot to chew on.

And thank you for the detailed replies.  I read them all, but only have
further comment on a handful.

> > Thanks for this clearly-written document!  I do have several
> > suggestions for improvements, and note many places where IS-IS and OSPF
> > seem to be described as normative references would, in the vein of
> > Mirja's DISCUSS.  I think it is possible to adjust the document to keep
> > those as informative references, but the changes might be pretty
> > intrusive.
> 
> I'm going to come back to Mirja's Discuss (and part of Alvaro's Discuss) when I have some more clarity about how the LSR working group is advancing the relevant drafts.
> 
> > I'm a little confused about what exactly the new protocol specified here
> > is -- there seems to be a lot of "use these existing technologies
> > together in the following way" going on, that may be screening the
> > actual new bits from prominence.  The only thing that comes to mind is
> > the requirement to use the explicit null label when the last label has
> > PHP and is going over the tunnel, which is admittedly important behavior
> > to have!  (To be clear, the implication is that a document consisting
> > solely of "glue these existing pieces together" could well be published
> > as Informational, though does not strictly speaking need to be.)
> 
> I think the same way. It *could* have been Informational, but Standards Track felt better in this case as it is telling people how make an operational system out of the existing building blocks.
> 
> > It might also be helpful to have a reference to RFC 4023 for the plain
> > MPLS-in-IP encapsulation, even just to contrast it to the MPLS-in-UDP
> > (RFC 7510) that we do use.  (This reader did not discern why the RFC
> > 4023 encapsulation was unpreferred.)
> 
> Oh, right.
> The short answer is "for the same reasons that 7510 unpreffered MPLS-in-IP" which was largely load balancing through an entropy indicator.
> Will add a short note.
> 
> > Section-by-section comments follow.
> >
> > Abstract
> >
> >                                                               SR-MPLS
> >   could be leveraged to realize a source routing mechanism across MPLS,
> >   IPv4, and IPv6 data planes by using an MPLS label stack as a source
> >   routing instruction set while preserving backward compatibility with
> >   SR-MPLS.
> >
> > Is this really saying "SR-MPLS could be leveraged ... while preserving
> > compatibility with SR-MPLS"?
> 
> Fixed per Alvaro's comments.
> 
> > Section 1 (Introduction)
> > 
> > Similarly to the above:
> 
> Ditto
> 
> > Section 2
> >
> >   o  If encoding of entropy ([RFC6790] is desired, IP tunneling
> >      mechanisms that allow encoding of entropy, such as MPLS-in-UDP
> >      encapsulation [RFC7510] where the source port of the UDP header is
> >
> > I think it was already noted, but this language reads a little oddly,
> > and it might be better as "If injection of additional entropy into the
> > flow is needed".
> 
> Just buffed up that text a bit.
> 
> > Section 3.1
> >
> >   Consider router A that receives a labeled packet with top label L(E)
> >   that corresponds to the prefix-SID SID(E) of prefix P(E) advertised
> >   by router E.  Suppose the i-th next-hop router (termed NHi) along the
> >   shortest path from router A toward SID(E) is not SR-MPLS capable
> >   while both routers A and E are SR-MPLS capable.  [...]
> >
> > Do we ever actually use the fact that it is specifically the i-th router
> > that is SR-MPLS-incapable, or just need to know that at least one router
> > on the path is deficient in that way?
> 
> It is just a name for that router.
> It is mentioned again on the last line of section 3.1
> 
> >   o  The Segment Routing Global Block (SRGB) is defined in [RFC8402].
> >      Router E is SR-MPLS capable, so it advertises an SRGB as described
> >      in [I-D.ietf-ospf-segment-routing-extensions] and
> >      [I-D.ietf-isis-segment-routing-extensions].
> >
> > I see the first sentence was added in discussion with another reviewer;
> > I wonder if the text would flow better if the order of the sentences was
> > swapped (particularly since this is the very first "processing step",
> > and that declarative sentence does not describe any processing
> > actions).
> 
> I'll work something out. The "as described" had confused a previous reader because it seemed to suggest that the SRGB was defined in those drafts.
> 
> >   o  When Router E advertises the prefix-SID SID(E) of prefix P(E) it
> >     MUST also advertise the encapsulation endpoint and the tunnel type
> >      of any tunnel used to reach E.  It does this using the mechanisms
> >      described in [I-D.ietf-isis-encapsulation-cap] or
> >      [I-D.ietf-ospf-encapsulation-cap].
> >
> > This "it does this" still is implying that IS-IS and OSPF are the only
> > ways this can be done, which (AIUI) is not the intention.  (Similarly
> > for the next bullet point's sub-bullets.)
> 
> s/it does this/it can do this/
> 
> >      *  If router E is running ISIS and advertises the ISIS
> >         capabilities TLV (TLV 242) [RFC7981], it MUST set the "router-
> >
> > nit: 7981 seems to call this the "ISIS Router CAPABILITY TLV"; I don't
> > know if the usage here has since become conventional.
> 
> s/ies/y/
> 
> >   o  Router A programs the FIB entry for prefix P(E) corresponding to
> >      the SID(E) as follows:
> >
> > Keeping with the theme, this is a declarative statement of procedure,
> > and the following sub-bullets only cover OSPF and ISIS.  It would need
> > to be a statement of requirements for behavior/functionality in order to
> > keep them from being normative references.
> >
> >   Once constructed, the FIB can be used to tell a router how to process
> >   packets.  It encapsulates the packets according to the encapsulation
> >   advertised in [I-D.ietf-isis-encapsulation-cap] or
> >   [I-D.ietf-ospf-encapsulation-cap].  Then it sends the packets towards
> >   the next hop NHi.
> >
> > Oh, finally, "NHi" appears again.  But are we actually forwarding
> > towards the SR-MPLS-incapable router specifically, or just generically
> > to the immediate next hop (which may or may not be NHi)?
> 
> I told you so 😉
> It really means NHi. The previous hop does the encapsulation and then forwards *towards* (i.e., out of the interface pointing at NHi) but not with the DA set to NHi.
> 
> > Also, I'll note that we introduced this list with "the following
> > processing steps apply [for A wanting to send a packet towards E]", but
> > most of the procedures therein involve things that E has to do to
> > advertise the information that A will need in order to make the
> > encapsulation, which feels like somewhat mismatched language.  In short,
> > this list of points doesn't tell me much about what specifically *A*
> > does with this packet -- the last point handles what to do with the top
> > label, but I guess we defer to the encapsulation scheme for the gory
> > details (which is probably fine, but maybe the language could be tidied
> > up to mention something about "using the appropriate mechanism for the
> > selected tunnel type (e.g., IP)").
> 
> I'm going to call upon your "which is probably fine".
> 
> >  packets.  It encapsulates the packets according to the encapsulation
> >   advertised in [I-D.ietf-isis-encapsulation-cap] or
> >   [I-D.ietf-ospf-encapsulation-cap].  Then it sends the packets towards
> >
> > nit: advertised *using the mechanisms in*
> 
> Ack
> 
> > Section 3.2
> >
> >   [RFC7510] specifies an IP-based encapsulation for MPLS, i.e., MPLS-
> >   in-UDP.  This approach is applicable where IP-based encapsulation for
> >   MPLS is required and further fine-grained load balancing of MPLS
> >   packets over IP networks over Equal-Cost Multipath (ECMP) and/or Link
> >   Aggregation Groups (LAGs) is also required.  This section provides
> >   details about the forwarding procedure when when UDP encapsulation is
> >   adopted for SR-MPLS over IP.
> >
> > (side note) Presumably this is just my lack of background showing, but
> > this text seems to assume that the UDP encapsulation is the only way to
> > do SR-MPLS over IP, with no discussion of RFC 4023.
> 
> This section is certainly limited to the UDP choice.
> Actually, we can add "Other encapsulation and tunnelling mechanisms can be applied using similar techniques, but for clarity this section uses UDP encapsulation as the exemplar."
> 
> >  Nodes that are SR-MPLS capable can process SR-MPLS packets.  Not all
> >  of the nodes in an SR-MPLS domain are SR-MPLS capable.  Some nodes
> >  may be "legacy routers" that cannot handle SR-MPLS packets but can
> >  forward IP packets.  An SR-MPLS-capable node MAY advertise its
> >  capabilities using the IGP as described in Section 3.  There are six
> >  types of node in an SR-MPLS domain:
> >
> > (side note) Similarly, we only talk about SR-MPLS and IP routers here;
> > is there some intermediate "MPLS but not SR-MPLS" category or similar?
> 
> Ah, a good question.
> MPLS routers are automatically able to forward SR-MPLS packets. So, if they lack SR capabilities they still participate seamlessly.
> And, in cast, if you had a sea of MPLS routers, you wouldn't need any encapsulation at all.
> 
> > Also, the top-level Section 3 is just introductory text and doesn't
> > really describe much of anything, and if we are considering this to
> > refer to Section 3 and subsections, it then becomes self-referential.
> 
> I think it applies to 3.2.
> 
> > Section 3.2.1
> >
> >                                           Routers A, E, G, and H
> >   advertise their Segment Routing related information via IS-IS or
> >   OSPF.
> >
> > [still declarative]
> 
> Still fixing 😊
> 
> >   To handle this, when a router (here it is router G) pops the final
> >   SR-MPLS label, it inserts an explicit null label [RFC3032] before
> >   encapsulating the packet in an MPLS-over-UDP tunnel toward router H
> >   and sending it out.  That is, router G pops the top label, discovers
> >   it has reached the bottom of stack, pushes an explicit null label,
> >   and then encapsulates the MPLS packet in a UDP tunnel to router H.
> >
> > This seems like a critical functional behavior that is not specific to
> > the usage of IS-IS or OSPF.
> 
> Agreed. Covered by previous fix.
> 
> > Section 3.2.3
> >
> >      For instance, in the example as described in Figure 4, assume F is
> >      now an SR-MPLS-capable transit node while all the other
> >      assumptions keep unchanged, since F is not identified by a SID in
> >      the stack and an MPLS-over-UDP tunnel is preferred to an MPLS LSP
> >      according to local policies, router E would replace the current
> >      top label with an MPLS-over-UDP tunnel toward router G and send it
> >      out.
> >
> > (nit: There's a comma splice before "since F".)
> 
> Ack
> 
> > This description is a little sparse, and seems to assume the reader
> > knows that, all else being equal, with E, F, and G all being
> > MPLS-capable, the segment from E to G would transit native MPLS, absent
> > the indicated local policy.  Since this is explicitly the thing we are
> > contrasting against, it's probably good style to mention the behavior
> > explicitly, too.
> 
> OK. "Good style" is our watchword.
> 
> >   IP Header Fields:  When encapsulating an MPLS packet in UDP, the
> >      resulting packet is further encapsulated in IP for transmission.
> >      IPv4 or IPv6 may be used according to the capabilities of the
> >      network.  The address fields are set as described in Section 2.
> >
> > (Does Section 2 say how to set the source address?)
> 
> Sure does.
>       The tunnel selected MUST have its
>       remote end point (destination) address equal to the address of the
>       next SR-MPLS capable node along the path (i.e., the egress of the
>       active node segment).

I might still be missing it.  Is the idea that once you've selected a
specific tunnel, that naturally will have a record of the source address
corresponding to that tunnel?  (I only see a literal "remote end point
(destination) address" in the quoted text, i.e., "source" or "local" do not
appear.)

> >   Entropy and ECMP:  When encapsulating an MPLS packet with an IP
> >      tunnel header that is capable of encoding entropy (such as
> >      [RFC7510]), the corresponding entropy field (the source port in
> >      case UDP tunnel) MAY be filled with an entropy value that is
> >
> > nit: "in the case of a UDP tunnel"
> 
> Ack
> 
> > Section 5
> >
> > [I'm going to comment on basically every line here; sorry to be so
> > nitpicky.]
> 
> I'm going to cross-check. If you have left a line uncommented I will demand a refund.
> If only we had written more lines.
> 
> >   The security consideration of [RFC8354] and [RFC7510] apply.  DTLS
> >
> > RFC 8354's security considerations are, for practical purposes, empty.
> > Perhaps a direct reference to 5095 would be more appropriate.
> > (The RFC 7510 security considerations are of course quite relevant and
> > helpful.)
> 
> Yes, let's have...
> The security consideration of [RFC8354] (which redirects the reader to [RFC5095]) and [RFC7510] apply
> ...since 8354 remains the more "relevant" reference.
> 
> >  [RFC6347] SHOULD be used where security is needed on an MPLS-SR-over-
> >  UDP segment.
> >
> > I think you need to give some indication of when that might be the case,
> > e.g., if the IP segment crosses the public Internet or some other
> > untrusted environment.
> 
> I guess that is a good example. I'm worried that it may limit the imagination of the reader.
> 
> I'm going to use "including when" in place of "e.g., if"

I was not intending to suggest that the "e.g." appear in the document, so
thank you for this.

> >   It is difficult for an attacker to pass a raw MPLS encoded packet
> >   into a network and operators have considerable experience at
> >   excluding such packets at the network boundaries.
> >
> > This is describing an expected/desired state (hopefully also the current
> > state!) but not why that should be or what the consequences of failing
> > to achieve that state are.  I'm happy to contribute some text, but this
> > seems like a generic MPLS consideration and I hope there is an
> > already-published reference that could be used instead.
> 
> Well, I'll add a reference to 5920, but I don't think that completely covers it.
> This is the equivalent of an ACL to prevent IP-in-IP intrusion, but essentially says don't let MPLS emerge from an IP tunnel in the network. Everyone does it, not sure it is documented anywhere.
> 
> That gives us...
> 
>       It is difficult for an attacker to pass a raw MPLS encoded packet
>       into a network and operators have considerable experience at excluding
>       such packets at the network boundaries, for example by excluding all
>       MPLS packets that are revealed as payload of IP tunnels. Further discussion
>       of MPLS security is found in [RFC5920].

Thanks.  (I was pretty sure everyone does it, but that doesn't always mean
that we don't need to say it in the doc, as I'm sure you know...)

> >   It is easy for an ingress node to detect any attempt to smuggle an IP
> >   packet into the network since it would see that the UDP destination
> >   port was set to MPLS.  SR packets not having a destination address
> >
> > Easy, sure, if you know to look for it.  Where is that requirement
> > mandated?
> 
> We don't mandate against self-harm.
> But I add...
>        , and such filtering SHOULD be applied
> 
> >   terminating in the network would be transparently carried and would
> >   pose no security risk to the network under consideration.
> >
> > I'm not sure I see how the second sentence relates to the first; is this
> > just trying to say that SR-MPLS is transparent to traffic flowing over
> > such a network?  There would still be generic capacity risks, of course,
> > though maybe we don't need to be so specific -- "pose no different
> > security risk than any other traffic" would be plenty.
> 
> OK
> 
> >  Where control plane techniques are used (as described in Section 3),
> >  it is important that these protocols are adequately secured for the
> >  environment in which they are run.
> >
> > What does "adequately secured" mean?  Is there a best-practices
> > document, or security considerations for the control protocols in
> > question that cover this?  Is the needed property that "any packets
> > interpreted as MPLS must be originated from authorized network devices
> > within the administrative domain (or group of such domains), with no
> > ability for attackers to inject such traffic inside the domain and
> > blocking at the boundary"?  When different administrative domains are
> > joined together, what are the counterparty risks?
> 
> OK, these are not MPLS packets, they are control plane packets.
> The injection of MPLS packets was where we were a few comments further up.
> 
> "Adequately secured" is indeed a wide scope. I think 5920 is our base reference for all MPLS control plane security issues.
> 
> But perhaps 6862 as well.

OK, I trust you to know better than I would.

Thanks again,

Ben