Re: [mpls] AD review of draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth

"Adrian Farrel" <adrian@olddog.co.uk> Thu, 17 April 2014 15:42 UTC

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From: Adrian Farrel <adrian@olddog.co.uk>
To: 'Loa Andersson' <loa@pi.nu>, draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth.all@tools.ietf.org
References: <002301cf5743$b1a74af0$14f5e0d0$@olddog.co.uk> <534FB734.2020005@pi.nu> <03d801cf5a3e$4327fcc0$c977f640$@olddog.co.uk> <534FDA11.4030209@pi.nu>
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Date: Thu, 17 Apr 2014 16:41:52 +0100
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Subject: Re: [mpls] AD review of draft-ietf-mpls-ldp-hello-crypto-auth
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> It is the tension between
> 
>  > There is a risk with the Hello and it needs a solution.
>  > No issue with that, and I support this draft.
> 
> and
> 
>  > why a bad actor within the network would waste its time attacking LDP
>  > when there is so much else it can do!
> 
> The first seems says that there is a risk that needs to be taken care
> of, the second seems to say that this is moot.

*If* a bad actor within the network is the only vulnerability, and *if*all* such
bad actors are compromised routers, then it is moot. But "moot" means "subject
to debate, dispute, or uncertainty." Let's debate :-)

Without seeing the text that describes how the attacks might be made, I
(probably like the rest of the WG) am assuming "Here is a security hole: we had
better plug it."

Knowing there is a hole, and knowing what the fix is, is really important. That
means the I-D should be published as an RFC, whatever.

Knowing when the solution needs to be used is an important piece of additional
guidance to make the document more useful.

Adrian