[mpowr] Troops versus superpower

[Alex Rousskov <[e-mail]>]

On Wed, 17 Dec 2003, Dave Crocker wrote:

> However I think that your own point about the inherent power of the
> working group, compared with the derived power of IETF management,
> including chairs, is the most important point.
>
> This is where reference to the IETF's being a volunteer organization
> is so important. The troops really are in charge.  When we run
> things without paying attention to that, we get volunteers who
> leave, by giving up on the working group.

Dave,

	While I would really like to see IETF functioning that way, I
have a hard time combining "in-charge troops" and "IESG does the final
review and approval and might even modify documents at will". Perhaps
somebody can help me here. I understand that IESG is elected by the
troops. However, if we assume that an election grants superpowers,
then it seems natural to assume that IESG-appointed chair can also
have superpowers within a WG scope.

In other words, you cannot make the "troops" argument against Chair
powers without making a similar argument about IESG or AD powers.
IESG/ADs simply want to delegate a portion of their power to Chairs,
with what they believe sufficient controls. Don't like that?  Appeal,
elect a different IESG, or drastically change the IESG role.

I can understand an organization where the working group is a
superpower, with rules and procedures for cross-group review and
conflict resolution. I can understand an organization where the IESG
is the superpower, with rules and procedures to encourage WG work and
elect IESG. If current IETF is the second kind of an organization (and
it looks like that to me), are we not fooling ourselves with "troops"
arguments? It seems to me that we should either

	- relax and let IESG disperse its powers to Chairs
	  any way it seems fit; it should be within IESG
	  powers to do so if IESG already has powers of so
	  many more important aspects of WG work

	- remove superpowers from IESG and have a WG decide
	  on its Chair authority; leave IESG its current
	  final conflict resolution power.

Both options have real-life precedence in other SDOs, of course. We
seem to be stuck trying to invent a third option that carefully draws
a line between effectively powerless WG and an effective IESG
superpower, with a Chair standing on that line. Such an option may not
exist.

Alex.

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