Re: [mpowr] Re: [Solutions] Further work on WG (chair) roles - MPOWR WG proposal

[Pete Resnick <[e-mail]>]

On 12/15/03 at 12:53 PM -0800, James Kempf wrote:

>I disagree. I see nothing in 2026 or 2418 that gives a WG chair the 
>authority to hold a document because they believe there are flaws in 
>the design.

I don't know with whom you're disagreeing, because I never said that 
and I don't believe that. I don't believe a WG chair has the 
authority to hold a document because they believe there are flaws in 
the design, nor do I believe that a chair should have such authority. 
I said that the chair can hold a document if there is not rough 
consensus in the WG that the document is ready to go to the IESG.

>Rough concensus doesn't mean one person objects,

Agreed.

>it means some significant number, over a majority object.

And with that I disagree. Though  it is almost always true that a 
rough consensus *is* over a majority of people agreeing, sometimes 
it's not. Sometimes it's a significant *minority* agreeing and the 
majority not feeling strongly at all. That's part of the reason we 
often do hums instead of straw polls: Sometimes it's not a matter of 
the majority, but the strength of the agreement or disagreement. If 
I've got a WG with 2 people who propose that "X" should be in a 
protocol, 100 people who express a preference for "X" but don't care 
strongly one way or the other, and 20 people who object that "X" will 
actively cause damage, there is *not* rough consensus to put "X" in 
the protocol.

>Besides, if the WG chair does hold the document, what are they 
>supposed to do with it?

Post to the list, "There is still a significant number of outstanding 
objections to X, Y, and Z, and nobody here has either persuaded the 
objectors that their problems have been addressed or given any reason 
why the objections should be ignored. Until those issues are 
addressed, we do not have rough consensus in this working group to 
pass the document on to the IESG."

>Under the current rules, the only alternative is for the chair to 
>get on the list and try to work the concensus behind what they 
>believe is the correct solution , and presumably they've tried that 
>already (if they've been a good chair).

First of all, no, the chair should not work for what *they* believe 
is the correct solution (at least in their role as chair). The chair 
can try to get the two sides to come to consensus, but shouldn't push 
their own agenda.

But second of all, even if we're talking about 1 or 2 individuals, 
section 6.5.1 of 2026 addresses *exactly* this problem: The chair 
tries to resolve the dispute, and if not then bring it to the AD, and 
then the IESG, and then the IAB. I suppose if the chair is the *only* 
person objecting (and I want to know how *that* happened), this 
process can also be used, just starting from the AD.

And again, if we've already gotten to this point by the time the WG 
is asking for IETF Last Call, there was a serious management 
breakdown long ago, and I don't want the remedy for that to be "let 
the chair veto anything they feel like". That will only encourage 
lousy chairs to leave their objections to the end of the process and 
then trump.

>There is also a point about the role of reviews that I perhaps did 
>not articulate clearly. The point is that the reviewers are outside 
>the WG, so that they function like a traditional QA team in software 
>development, as a check on the spec developers (and thus on WG 
>concensus); otherwise, the utility of the reviews is limited. Thus, 
>they are not, strictly speaking, subject to WG concensus.

I'm sorry, but this is just nonsense. The point of these kinds of 
reviews is to get input from folks who wouldn't normally be 
participating in the WG (due to time constraints or field of 
expertise), but not to have some sort of unchecked authority over the 
WG. The IETF is a consensus organization (that's where the 
"authority" lies), so *of course* reviews are subject to WG consensus.

And of course the reviews are still of value. Your entire scenario 
for them not being of value is that we have a completely rouge WG 
which refuses to listen. We should not be designing our procedures 
around that sort of world view.

>I don't think it would be helpful to go into microsurgery on the 
>example I gave, but in that particular case, several of the 
>reviewers did, in fact, get involved in the list discussion 
>precisely *because* their reviews had no authority to change WG 
>concensus under current rules, so trying to influence concensus was 
>the only way they could get their changes instituted (to their 
>credit).

That I think is exactly the right way to go. Or, if the WG simply 
refused to heed their reviews, they could have objected under 2026, 
6.5.1.

>I agree with Margaret's basic contention: the WG chairs need the 
>authority to be able to hold specs because, in their design 
>judgement, the spec is flawed.

I have yet to hear any reasoned explanation for why this authority is 
necessary given our other procedures.

pr
-- 
Pete Resnick <http://www.qualcomm.com/~presnick/>
QUALCOMM Incorporated - Direct phone: [phone], Fax: [phone]

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