[MSEC] [Errata Rejected] RFC3830 (4638)

RFC Errata System <rfc-editor@rfc-editor.org> Tue, 15 March 2016 12:41 UTC

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Subject: [MSEC] [Errata Rejected] RFC3830 (4638)
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The following errata report has been rejected for RFC3830,
"MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing".

--------------------------------------
You may review the report below and at:
http://www.rfc-editor.org/errata_search.php?rfc=3830&eid=4638

--------------------------------------
Status: Rejected
Type: Technical

Reported by: Christopher Dearlove <chris.dearlove@baesystems.com>;
Date Reported: 2016-03-15
Rejected by: Stephen Farrell (IESG)

Section: 4.2.8

Original Text
-------------
   The timestamp is as defined in NTP [NTP], i.e., a 64-bit number in
   seconds relative to 0h on 1 January 1900.  An implementation MUST be
   aware of (and take into account) the fact that the counter will
   overflow approximately every 136th year.  It is RECOMMENDED that the
   time always be specified in UTC.


Corrected Text
--------------
   The timestamp is as defined in NTP [NTP], i.e., a 64-bit number in
   seconds relative to 0h on 1 January 1900.  It is RECOMMENDED that the
   time always be specified in UTC.


Notes
-----
A 32-bt number of seconds overflows in about 136.1 years. A 64-bit number of seconds will, for all practical purposes, not overflow.

(The use in Section 4.2.3 is of a 64 bit number, not a 32 bit number, so 64 bits is correct.)
 --VERIFIER NOTES-- 
   Only 32 bits of the 64 count seconds. That's clear from the referenced NTP spec.

--------------------------------------
RFC3830 (draft-ietf-msec-mikey-08)
--------------------------------------
Title               : MIKEY: Multimedia Internet KEYing
Publication Date    : August 2004
Author(s)           : J. Arkko, E. Carrara, F. Lindholm, M. Naslund, K. Norrman
Category            : PROPOSED STANDARD
Source              : Multicast Security
Area                : Security
Stream              : IETF
Verifying Party     : IESG