Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws

Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> Thu, 10 June 2021 16:31 UTC

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To: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>, Jay Daley <jay@ietf.org>, mtgvenue@ietf.org
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From: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>
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Subject: Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws
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On 6/10/21 00:08, John C Klensin wrote:
> It is a slightly different question but, if we accept your
> description of the "top-line issue" and follow your reasoning,
> does it not obligate us to be certain that there are plain-text
> versions of all of our protocols


No, it does not.


> Without trying to take a position on Jay's question, my
> recollection is that we made our meeting in Beijing conditional
> on unrestricted access to the global public Internet, including
> the use of encrypted traffic


And TOLA, of course, does not prevent this. HTTPS, VPNs, and the use of 
other encryption technologies remains legal. For the sake of clarity, 
here's a fairly concise summary of the controversial provisions of the 
TOLA Act: 
https://corrs.com.au/insights/australias-security-monitor-recommends-changes-to-controversial-anti-encryption-legislation

It is egregious overreach, of course, but has no bearing on the work we 
do during a meeting. Even in the Kafakaesque scenario of Australia 
attempting to issue a TCN for someone visiting for a week, the end 
result would be meaningless: development of the envisioned capabilities 
happens in weeks and months, not hours and days. Setting foot in a 
country does not bind its laws to you forever: I've visited Japan, and 
yet my possession of pseudoephedrine in Texas doesn't put me at legal 
risk from Japanese authorities.

/a