Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws

John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> Thu, 10 June 2021 05:08 UTC

Return-Path: <john-ietf@jck.com>
X-Original-To: mtgvenue@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: mtgvenue@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 279213A3465; Wed, 9 Jun 2021 22:08:26 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.897
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id KAzdDzmOE66J; Wed, 9 Jun 2021 22:08:20 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from bsa2.jck.com (bsa2.jck.com [70.88.254.51]) (using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBCCD3A3462; Wed, 9 Jun 2021 22:08:19 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from [198.252.137.10] (helo=PSB) by bsa2.jck.com with esmtp (Exim 4.82 (FreeBSD)) (envelope-from <john-ietf@jck.com>) id 1lrCvS-000PBP-8m; Thu, 10 Jun 2021 01:08:18 -0400
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 01:08:13 -0400
From: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>, Jay Daley <jay@ietf.org>, mtgvenue@ietf.org
Message-ID: <1F7A2AED46C3513B4F6BD68C@PSB>
In-Reply-To: <a9c9622f-b499-f7de-5078-267f76f0530f@nostrum.com>
References: <45CB2336-8E0E-49AE-A625-3F0989EE4CA5@ietf.org> <a9c9622f-b499-f7de-5078-267f76f0530f@nostrum.com>
X-Mailer: Mulberry/4.0.8 (Win32)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Content-Disposition: inline
X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 198.252.137.10
X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: john-ietf@jck.com
X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on bsa2.jck.com); SAEximRunCond expanded to false
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/mtgvenue/r9p__8IvUXRjjpMw_MItQadzK4Y>
Subject: Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws
X-BeenThere: mtgvenue@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: "List for email discussion of the IAOC meeting venue selection process." <mtgvenue.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/mtgvenue>, <mailto:mtgvenue-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/mtgvenue/>
List-Post: <mailto:mtgvenue@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:mtgvenue-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/mtgvenue>, <mailto:mtgvenue-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 05:08:26 -0000


--On Wednesday, June 9, 2021 21:08 -0700 Adam Roach
<adam@nostrum.com> wrote:

> While I agree in principle that going somewhere with terrible
> encryption policy is bad optics, I fear the practicality of
> extending this principle to all countries with similar flaws
> regarding cryptography is likely to require either drawing an
> arbitrary and ever-shifting line between which laws are okay
> and those which are not, or limit us in upcoming years to
> meeting on one of the few areas of terra nullius remaining
> within theoretical reach (e.g., Antarctica, the moon, Mars,
> and some small pockets of unclaimed land near Egypt and near
> Croatia).
> 
> https://cpj.org/2021/05/uk-online-safety-bill-raises-censorshi
> p-concerns-and-questions-on-future-of-encryption/
> 
> https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/graham-cot
> ton-blackburn-introduce-balanced-solution-to-bolster-national-
> security-end-use-of-warrant-proof-encryption-that-shields-crim
> inal-activity
> 
> https://www.gadgetsnow.com/featured/how-indias-demand-for-what
> sapp-traceability-is-in-line-with-what-us-australia-canada-and
> -others-are-already-working-on/articleshow/83026161.cms
> 
> The top-line issue is that cryptography is under legal attack
> all over the world, and it may rapidly become untenable to
> avoid governments who have made citizen surveillance a
> priority over citizen privacy. Folks here who do or can do
> policy work definitely have a role to play in shaping what the
> future looks like, but I don't think it would remain tenable
> for our meetings to avoid all the places that governments are
> making these decisions.

Adam,

It is a slightly different question but, if we accept your
description of the "top-line issue" and follow your reasoning,
does it not obligate us to be certain that there are plain-text
versions of all of our protocols, strongly encouraging use of
encrypted versions when they are legal and/or feasible, but
avoiding essentially telling people to get off the Internet if
they are in places where strong, end to end (or nearly so),
cryptography is prohibited or prohibited without government
access or back doors.

Without trying to take a position on Jay's question, my
recollection is that we made our meeting in Beijing conditional
on unrestricted access to the global public Internet, including
the use of encrypted traffic.  If we were to follow that
precedent, we should ask the Australian government to exempt
those attending and supporting our meeting from those rules
rather than discarding Australia as a possible meeting site
without making that request.

   john