Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws
John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com> Thu, 10 June 2021 05:08 UTC
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Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2021 01:08:13 -0400
From: John C Klensin <john-ietf@jck.com>
To: Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com>, Jay Daley <jay@ietf.org>, mtgvenue@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws
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--On Wednesday, June 9, 2021 21:08 -0700 Adam Roach <adam@nostrum.com> wrote: > While I agree in principle that going somewhere with terrible > encryption policy is bad optics, I fear the practicality of > extending this principle to all countries with similar flaws > regarding cryptography is likely to require either drawing an > arbitrary and ever-shifting line between which laws are okay > and those which are not, or limit us in upcoming years to > meeting on one of the few areas of terra nullius remaining > within theoretical reach (e.g., Antarctica, the moon, Mars, > and some small pockets of unclaimed land near Egypt and near > Croatia). > > https://cpj.org/2021/05/uk-online-safety-bill-raises-censorshi > p-concerns-and-questions-on-future-of-encryption/ > > https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/press/rep/releases/graham-cot > ton-blackburn-introduce-balanced-solution-to-bolster-national- > security-end-use-of-warrant-proof-encryption-that-shields-crim > inal-activity > > https://www.gadgetsnow.com/featured/how-indias-demand-for-what > sapp-traceability-is-in-line-with-what-us-australia-canada-and > -others-are-already-working-on/articleshow/83026161.cms > > The top-line issue is that cryptography is under legal attack > all over the world, and it may rapidly become untenable to > avoid governments who have made citizen surveillance a > priority over citizen privacy. Folks here who do or can do > policy work definitely have a role to play in shaping what the > future looks like, but I don't think it would remain tenable > for our meetings to avoid all the places that governments are > making these decisions. Adam, It is a slightly different question but, if we accept your description of the "top-line issue" and follow your reasoning, does it not obligate us to be certain that there are plain-text versions of all of our protocols, strongly encouraging use of encrypted versions when they are legal and/or feasible, but avoiding essentially telling people to get off the Internet if they are in places where strong, end to end (or nearly so), cryptography is prohibited or prohibited without government access or back doors. Without trying to take a position on Jay's question, my recollection is that we made our meeting in Beijing conditional on unrestricted access to the global public Internet, including the use of encrypted traffic. If we were to follow that precedent, we should ask the Australian government to exempt those attending and supporting our meeting from those rules rather than discarding Australia as a possible meeting site without making that request. john
- [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Jay Daley
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Adam Roach
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws John C Klensin
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Eliot Lear
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Deen, Glenn (NBCUniversal)
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Eliot Lear
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Adam Roach
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Brian E Carpenter
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws George Michaelson
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws John C Klensin
- Re: [Mtgvenue] Australia and its encryption laws Cullen Jennings