Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL
Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> Thu, 23 January 2020 16:47 UTC
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From: Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca>
To: Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com>
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Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 11:47:16 -0500
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Subject: Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL
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Eliot Lear <lear@cisco.com> wrote: >> On 23 Jan 2020, at 03:33, Michael Richardson <mcr+ietf@sandelman.ca> wrote: >> >> >> Maybe the file could have something assertive, like: "bad bad, do not run, >> quarantine now" as flag? >> > If the MUD file itself contains an error that overexposes a vulnerable > device, it seems to me that the proper course of action is simply to > post a correction that will get picked up sometime after the > cache-validity period expires. Assume that it's not the file itself that is broken, but the firmware that references it. That is, version N of the firmware is bad, and it references mud file example.com/revN.json. How does the manufacturer indicate to the MUD controller that, if you have revN, that you want it offline. > As to your other question: what if the MUD file can’t be reached? The > general answer is simple: keep doing what you were doing. Don’t change > policies because you can’t get to the mud file server. That’s just > asking for a boot to the head. If the device never had a MUD file, you > would have some default handling. If it already had a mud file, then > you have some policy to go with. Agreed, we should not change behaviour if the file is gone. The question is, is there a path which leads to the MUD controller abandonning the file? -- Michael Richardson <mcr+IETF@sandelman.ca>ca>, Sandelman Software Works -= IPv6 IoT consulting =-
- [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Michael Richardson
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Henk Birkholz
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Michael Richardson
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL M. Ranganathan
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Henk Birkholz
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Eliot Lear
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Michael Richardson
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Michael Richardson
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Ted Lemon
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Michael Richardson
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Eliot Lear
- Re: [Mud] how to increase trust in MUD URL Michael Richardson