[nasr] Re: Secure Routing Path Consideration- China Mobile-ietf120

[Luigi Iannone <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

isn’t this falling close to the concept of “proof of non transit”, i.e. being sure the traffic does _not_ go through a specific path?

I think this point was raised in the past but (while interesting) deemed to be too hard to solve (at least now).

I think that is a nice question to be asked in a couple of years, when we have implemented whatever solution NASR will design and see if “can we use it to prove (even partially) that traffic did not go here or there?"

Ciao

L.

> On 4 Oct 2024, at 10:38, junzhang <junzhang1=[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> Dear Michael and Toerless,
> 
>           In the cloud computing area, there is a concept called assured deletion, that is, to give a proof that after the data is removed from the cloud, and no one else can access it again. One typical approach to realize it is 
>           (1) encrypt the data such that it is computationally prohibitive to decrypt the data without the decryption key, 
> then (2) store the encrypted data in the cloud while keeping the decryption key secure, 
> and finally (3) securely delete the encryption key.
> 
>                   https://cdn.stmarytx.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/Cloud-Storage-Assured-Deletion-Considerations-and-Schemes.pdf
> 
>          Is it related to the avoidance of copying traffic that you have discussed?
>          Yours,
>                 Jun Zhang
> 
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Michael Richardson <[e-mail]> 
> Sent: Thursday, October 3, 2024 11:26 PM
> To: Toerless Eckert <[e-mail]>
> Cc: Liuchunchi(Peter) <[e-mail]>; =?us-ascii?B?PT91dGYtOD9CPzVZaVk2Ym1QNkw2Sj89?= <[e-mail]>; Meiling Chen <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
> Subject: [nasr] Re: 回复: Re: Secure Routing Path Consideration- China Mobile-ietf120
> 
> 
> Toerless Eckert <[e-mail]> wrote:
>> But avoidance of copying of traffic by undesired third parties if course a core
>> benefit that NASR can provide. And those prior examples can provide examples of
>> the attack vectors why that is undesirable. Even with todays easily available
>> end-to-end encryption.
> 
> NASR can not provide any kind of avoidance of copying!
> (To do that you'd need quantum entangled links of the kind the QIRG is contemplating)
> 
> What NASR can do is provide assurance that when you have such links, that:
> a) there are no stealth routers in the path.
> b) that the two sides of each QIRG link are operating nominally.
> 
>> But maybe much simpler: nation state actors have the means to extract and even decrypt
>> end-to-end traffic. But if they can not see the traffic because it does not run across
>> the paths desired by them, because they pass their network taps - then
>> they can't do that.
> 
> yes.
> 
> --
> Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
>           Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
> 
> 
> 
> 
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