[nasr] Re: 回复: Re: Secure Routing Path Consideration- China Mobile-ietf120

[Toerless Eckert <[e-mail]>]

Inline

On Thu, Oct 03, 2024 at 12:54:11PM -0400, Michael Richardson wrote:
> 
> Toerless Eckert <[e-mail]> wrote:
>     > The reason was simply that content providers had woken up to the attack vector
>     > of encryption keys to not be very good long-term, or that in multicast, the
>     > encrpyption key had to be shared to multiple subscribers, so some subscribers that
>     > where permitted to receive the content could extract and share the
>     > encryption key
> 
> It's an interesting storey, but I don't think it applies directly as a use
> case for NASR.

Well, depends of course how we scope NASR.

But avoidance of copying of traffic by undesired third parties if course a core
benefit that NASR can provide. And those prior examples can provide examples of
the attack vectors why that is undesirable. Even with todays easily available
end-to-end encryption.

> I'm trying to imagine a nation-state actor that replaces a stream with their
> own while the stream was passing through their borders.  That seems pretty
> tenuous, but not ridiculous to me.  Particularly when satellites might be involved.

Replacing TV provider advertisements with network access provider inserted advertisements
was pretty popular at some time ;-) 

But maybe much simpler: nation state actors have the means to extract and even decrypt
end-to-end traffic. But if they can not see the traffic because it does not run across
the paths desired by them, because they pass their network taps - then they can't do that.

Cheers
    Toerless

> --
> Michael Richardson <[e-mail]>   . o O ( IPv6 IøT consulting )
>            Sandelman Software Works Inc, Ottawa and Worldwide
> 
> 
> 
> 



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