Re: [nbs] NBS and TCP connection identification

Le 21 sept. 2010 à 13:19, Javier Ubillos a écrit :
>> ...
> Perhaps I misunderstand your concern, but I'll try to answer.
> On the individual host, there is a change to the implementation in the
> sense that the 4-tuple is now 
> name, service (port), name service(port)
> instead of the prevous
> ip, port, ip port.

Whether names can be sufficient at the socket interface, in some circumstances, has IMHO to be investigated.
For example:
- a name resolved to an SRV record doesn't need an application-provided server port.
- ports of connection initiators
  . are in general not significant to server applications
  . may be changed by NATs in IPv4

> 
> There are no changes to the "on the wire" protocol.
> 
> There are two ways of doing this.
> 1. Hashing the name into something that fits into the ip-address field.
> 2. Having a specialized TCP implementation.
> 
> I promote alternative 2.

+1  on this choice
(as already expressed in another mail, with destination-AND-source names possibly conveyed by SYNs ).

Regards,
RD


> In fact, we already have that bit working in the prototype.
> 
>>> - Security-wise, the idea is to bind DNS names to IP addresses by
>>> means of a forward lookup in the DNS.  This gives the same level of
>>> security that we have for DNS-based applications today, except that
>>> the forward lookup would not just be done by the connection
>>> initiator, but also by the connection responder.  Where higher
>>> security is required, we recommend DNSSEC.  Thus we can avoid extra
>>> cryptographic identifiers.
>> 
>> If X can predict that A will talk to B (using port1/port2), then X can 
>> send a SYN claiming to have A's name (and port1) destined to B/port2.
>> Later when A sends its SYN something on B has to be able to resolve 
>> things. The easy way is to verify that the initiator actually "owns" the 
>> name A before creating the TCP state for A/port1.
>> 
>> I don't understand what you mean by the forward lookup being done by the 
>> responder. Clearly the responder can't do a forward lookup when it 
>> receives a SYN packet, because that can be used to DoS the responder out 
>> of existence.
> 
> Hmmm, you might have a point here.
> We're going to have to consider this more.
> 
> There are two ideas on the table:
> a) Do nothing. 
> b) When receiving a name in an option, resolve that name and compare
> IP's with the just received IP.
> 
> Case a) _will_ happen if the name is not a resolvable FQDN.
> Case b) ... perhaps this is an issue we need to look at.
> I need to do some readingup on the subject.
> 
>> 
>>> - Hosts that don't have a name registered in the DNS will derive a
>>> DNS name from their IP address.  This will give them session
>>> continuity, albeit no reachability.
>> 
>> But that doesn't allow them to use SHIM6 to move around.
>> A CBID as a name allows them to move around.
> 
> It does, in the most primitive scenario, one enters an IP into the
> name-based socket, and that IP is used just as a label.
> 
> // Javier
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