[Nea] Fwd: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentication after Resumption
"Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com> Tue, 04 March 2014 11:06 UTC
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From: "Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)" <jsalowey@cisco.com>
To: "nea@ietf.org" <nea@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentication after Resumption
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Date: Tue, 04 Mar 2014 11:06:39 +0000
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References: <BB2FE60E-A7CA-4EA7-BFC8-AB794EC6FF00@inria.fr>
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Subject: [Nea] Fwd: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentication after Resumption
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The link below details a vulnerability involving session resumption and TLS channel bindings that is applicable to PT-TLS. There is ongoing discussion on the TLS and Kitten lists. https://secure-resumption.com<https://secure-resumption.com/> Basically if the TLS connection is torn down and resumed before channel binding within the EMA takes place a man-in-the-middle will not be discovered. Joe
- [Nea] Fwd: [TLS] MITM Attacks on Client Authentic… Joseph Salowey (jsalowey)