[netconf] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-notif-13: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw via Datatracker <[e-mail]>]

Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-netconf-restconf-notif-13: Discuss

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DISCUSS:
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Per Section 9, [draft-ietf-netconf-netconf-event-notifications] and
[draft-ietf-netconf-subscribed-notifications] mention concerns about a
“malicious or buggy subscriber sends a number of establish-subscription
requests” in their Security Considerations.  Is that not a concern here too?


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COMMENT:
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(1) Section 3.1.  “A subscriber can then attempt to re-establish the dynamic
subscription by using the procedure described in Section 3.”  This seems like a
circular reference.  This guidance (to go read Section 3) is being given in
Section 3.1 (which is inside Section 3).

(2) Section 3.3.  Missing word.
s/requests with publisher/requests with the publisher/

(3) Section 3.4.  “This initiates the publisher to initiate the flow …”.  I
stumbled over the double use of “initiate”.  Do you mean “This signals to the
publisher to initiate the flow …”?

(4) Section 3.4 suggests that NACM/related methods should be used to authorize
“modify-subscription, resync-subscription and delete-subscription” RPCs. 
Section 9, Security Considerations, says “Therefore, even if an attacker
succeeds in guessing the subscription URI, a RESTCONF username [RFC8040] with
the required administrative permissions must be used to be able to access or  
modify that subscription.”  Is there a reason not to say the obvious thing in
the Security Considerations that these particular RPCs should be protected
(with NACM/related methods like was stated in Section 3.4).