Re: [netconf] Latest ietf-netconf-server draft and related modules

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Thu, 29 April 2021 18:36 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Thu, 29 Apr 2021 18:36:16 +0000
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Cc: Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>
To: =?utf-8?Q?Michal_Va=C5=A1ko?= <mvasko@cesnet.cz>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] Latest ietf-netconf-server draft and related modules
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> On Apr 29, 2021, at 2:05 PM, Michal Vaško <mvasko@cesnet.cz> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, April 29, 2021 17:14 CEST, Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de> wrote:
> 
>> On Thu, Apr 29, 2021 at 05:09:28PM +0200, Juergen Schoenwaelder wrote:
>>> And ssh_config(5) says:
>>> 
>>>   Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication
>>>   methods.  This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
>>>   keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password).  The
>>>   default is:
>>> 
>>>             gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
>>>             keyboard-interactive,password
>>> 
>>> I have no idea how popular it is to change the default order, which is
>>> likely what most people expect.
>> 
>> Let me add that an implementation that does password before publickey
>> would be somewhat annoying. In other words, I have no opinion whether
>> this order needs to be made configurable but perhaps it is meaningful
>> to spell out a default order that implementors should consider.
> 
> Fair enough, that sounds reasonable and I suppose the default order should cover the majority of use-cases.
> 
> Michal


How about this (the last sentence), in ietf-ssh-client?

        The credentials are unordered.  Clients may initially send
         any configured method or, per RFC 4252, Section 5.2, send
         the 'none' method to prompt the server to provide a list
         of productive methods.  Whenever a choice amongst methods
         arises, implementations SHOULD use a default ordering that
         prioritizes automation over human-interaction.


K.