Re: [netconf] latest update to crypto-types and keystore drafts

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Mon, 05 August 2019 18:46 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2019 18:46:28 +0000
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Subject: Re: [netconf] latest update to crypto-types and keystore drafts
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> On Aug 5, 2019, at 3:58 AM, Balázs Kovács <balazs.kovacs@ericsson.com>; wrote:
> 
> Hi Kent,
>  
> Yes, it makes.
>  
> I assume the “secret” symmetric key could be just equally configured as normal private-key since the key is coming from outside, depending on the taste of the client if it is just a NACM protected normal private-key or an encrypted key.

Since a symmetric key have "secret" value more so than "private" value, if we replace "private-key" with "secret-key" above, then yes, I agree.  Stated more plainly, a platform that doesn't have a TPM (or equivalent) protected asymmetric key, could instead protect the operator's symmetric key using NACM (i.e., only the crypto-officer/ restore-session can access it).  Is this what you mean?


>  
> Br,
> Balazs
>  

Kent