[netconf] question regarding key naming

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Thu, 09 July 2020 14:11 UTC

Return-Path: <0100017333ea7297-2838a6f2-40ad-4ca5-a83a-23d3014bef92-000000@amazonses.watsen.net>
X-Original-To: netconf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: netconf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2C6553A0B0E for <netconf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 07:11:12 -0700 (PDT)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.897
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.897 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, HTML_MESSAGE=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2=-0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_NONE=0.001, URIBL_BLOCKED=0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Authentication-Results: ietfa.amsl.com (amavisd-new); dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=amazonses.com
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id LoHxmoeX8BFZ for <netconf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 07:11:11 -0700 (PDT)
Received: from a8-83.smtp-out.amazonses.com (a8-83.smtp-out.amazonses.com [54.240.8.83]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D23973A0B02 for <netconf@ietf.org>; Thu, 9 Jul 2020 07:11:10 -0700 (PDT)
DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/simple; s=224i4yxa5dv7c2xz3womw6peuasteono; d=amazonses.com; t=1594303869; h=From:Content-Type:Mime-Version:Subject:Date:References:To:In-Reply-To:Message-Id:Feedback-ID; bh=VFf+Lv9dtWLAKDcOQJSAPIJ3MGfk7J8+JaP1phIpbec=; b=OjF1UHSTvtbQ/Mv9OWCF/K5Ss2h8t/jdtLOaV8Ab3ICXcbWHZwudj1cX66pKqgV4 bCehMycZ/NcfV4qzXWm4n6D03Nct1ghBOBO2R2LqOzutHJI6h5oXJxfzMipZCtw49dl yux1nPjpp2ZuTL+EJGM3r6KYNx+1RnH3TjMHZYO0=
From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="Apple-Mail=_A043D553-FF2B-4B2C-8787-125406B63C3C"
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.4 \(3608.80.23.2.2\))
Date: Thu, 9 Jul 2020 14:11:09 +0000
References: <01000173313a1282-63366836-4a52-453a-a111-fd3334b2506e-000000@email.amazonses.com>
To: "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>
In-Reply-To: <01000173313a1282-63366836-4a52-453a-a111-fd3334b2506e-000000@email.amazonses.com>
Message-ID: <0100017333ea7297-2838a6f2-40ad-4ca5-a83a-23d3014bef92-000000@email.amazonses.com>
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3608.80.23.2.2)
X-SES-Outgoing: 2020.07.09-54.240.8.83
Feedback-ID: 1.us-east-1.DKmIRZFhhsBhtmFMNikgwZUWVrODEw9qVcPhqJEI2DA=:AmazonSES
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/ATSyw7sLpg5mAUSo_m1NmNXfbwI>
Subject: [netconf] question regarding key naming
X-BeenThere: netconf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: NETCONF WG list <netconf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/netconf>, <mailto:netconf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/netconf/>
List-Post: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:netconf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netconf>, <mailto:netconf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 09 Jul 2020 14:11:12 -0000

Question:

In the crypto-types draft, the symmetric and asymmetric key definitions each support three encodings for the secret key-data: cleartext, hidden, and encrypted.  To see this, here are direct links to the tree diagrams:

    - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-16#section-2.1.4.2 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-16#section-2.1.4.2>
    - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-16#section-2.1.4.4 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types-16#section-2.1.4.4>

My question is, should the “key” and “private-key” nodes be renamed to “cleartext-key” and “cleartext-private-key”?

    PROs:
        - a positive assertion the key is in the clear is more secure

    CONs:
        - a longer name for the most common case

Thoughts?



PS: I’m aware that the truststore draft’s "Data at Rest” Security Consideration section has a copy/paste error in it, which I’ll update that before the cutoff...

K.