Re: [netconf] x509c2n:cert-to-name problem

[Martin Bjorklund <[e-mail]>]

Hi,

Kent Watsen <[e-mail]> wrote:
> [moving this fork in the 'netmod' discussion to the 'netconf' list]
> 
> 
> >> The "tls-server-parameters" container defines the certificates used to
> >> authenticate the client's cert.  In many deployments, regardless how
> >> the client cert is authenticated, the "client-identification" section only
> >> needs to explain how to extract the "name" from the cert, a fingerprint
> >> isn't needed to identify either the client's end-entity or some
> >> intermediate cert.
> > 
> > Ok.  To me this sounds like you need a more complex^wsophisticated
> > client identification mechansim than what a plain cert-to-name gives
> > you.  I don't think there is anything wrong with the current
> > cert-to-name grouping.  So let's continue this discussion in the
> > netconf ML, where this model is being developed.
> 
> In an attempt to resolve this issue, I modified both ietf-netconf-server
> and ietf-restconf-server as follows:
> 
> OLD:
>         uses x509c2n:cert-to-name;
> 
> NEW:
>         uses x509c2n:cert-to-name {
>           refine "cert-to-name/fingerprint" {
>             mandatory false;
>             description
>               "A 'fingerprint' value does not need to be specified
>                when the 'cert-to-name' mapping is independent of
>                fingerprint matching.  A 'cert-to-name' having no
>                fingerprint value will match any client certificate
>                and therefore should only be present at the end of
>                the user-ordered 'cert-to-name' list.";
>           }
>         }

Did you see my email "client identification in ietf-netconf-server"?
I don't think this refinement is the correct solution.


/martin