Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy

"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Thu, 12 September 2019 17:02 UTC

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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>, Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>
CC: "housley@vigilsec.com" <housley@vigilsec.com>, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>, "sean@sn3rd.com" <sean@sn3rd.com>, "rifaat.ietf@gmail.com" <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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Date: Thu, 12 Sep 2019 17:02:27 +0000
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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You should not require every private key to have  the public key; they are often separated – e.g., most SSH implementations separate them. As you point out, they don’t share the same ASN1 data structures: a “25519” key is a bytestring, a DH key is two “bignums” (in OpenSSL terms), an RSA key is different from a DSA key, and so on.

I think saying “used by TLS” is not a good reason, we should really talk about the applications we are trying to configure and manage.  Or am I hopelessly wrong about netconf?  That could be likely, I’m only here for the crypto objects dicussions.