Re: [netconf] client identification in ietf-netconf-server

Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com> Thu, 14 November 2019 07:52 UTC

Return-Path: <mbj@tail-f.com>
X-Original-To: netconf@ietfa.amsl.com
Delivered-To: netconf@ietfa.amsl.com
Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7EF041208E7 for <netconf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 23:52:28 -0800 (PST)
X-Virus-Scanned: amavisd-new at amsl.com
X-Spam-Flag: NO
X-Spam-Score: -1.9
X-Spam-Level:
X-Spam-Status: No, score=-1.9 tagged_above=-999 required=5 tests=[BAYES_00=-1.9, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001] autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no
Received: from mail.ietf.org ([4.31.198.44]) by localhost (ietfa.amsl.com [127.0.0.1]) (amavisd-new, port 10024) with ESMTP id aigrIqj5VLUJ for <netconf@ietfa.amsl.com>; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 23:52:26 -0800 (PST)
Received: from mail.tail-f.com (mail.tail-f.com [46.21.102.45]) by ietfa.amsl.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id B720A1208D6 for <netconf@ietf.org>; Wed, 13 Nov 2019 23:52:25 -0800 (PST)
Received: from localhost (unknown [173.38.220.41]) by mail.tail-f.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 291D91AE0312; Thu, 14 Nov 2019 08:52:23 +0100 (CET)
Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 08:51:52 +0100 (CET)
Message-Id: <20191114.085152.69723351117040013.mbj@tail-f.com>
To: kent+ietf@watsen.net
Cc: netconf@ietf.org
From: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>
In-Reply-To: <0100016e661a2f48-26561fed-a533-4aec-8ad1-d68582b82b39-000000@email.amazonses.com>
References: <0100016e4d8323b0-2a182947-485d-43e6-908c-13bc5ad2f210-000000@email.amazonses.com> <20191111.110013.2019956803552089416.mbj@tail-f.com> <0100016e661a2f48-26561fed-a533-4aec-8ad1-d68582b82b39-000000@email.amazonses.com>
X-Mailer: Mew version 6.8 on Emacs 25.2
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: Text/Plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/ljvwASTPiVRMXA2_trLtekmGb7I>
Subject: Re: [netconf] client identification in ietf-netconf-server
X-BeenThere: netconf@ietf.org
X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29
Precedence: list
List-Id: NETCONF WG list <netconf.ietf.org>
List-Unsubscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/options/netconf>, <mailto:netconf-request@ietf.org?subject=unsubscribe>
List-Archive: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/netconf/>
List-Post: <mailto:netconf@ietf.org>
List-Help: <mailto:netconf-request@ietf.org?subject=help>
List-Subscribe: <https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netconf>, <mailto:netconf-request@ietf.org?subject=subscribe>
X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 07:52:28 -0000

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> wrote:
> Hi Martin,
> 
> 
> > Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com> wrote:
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> wrote:
> >> 
> >> Hi Martin,
> >> 
> >> [Not trimming down because too much context would be lost.]
> >> 
> >> 
> >>>>> The ietf-netconf-server module has this:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> grouping netconf-server-grouping {
> >>>>>  ...
> >>>>>  container client-identification {
> >>>>>    ...
> >>>>>    container cert-maps {
> >>>>>      when "../../../../tls";
> >>>>>      uses x509c2n:cert-to-name;
> >>>>>      ...
> >>>>>    }
> >>>>>  }
> >>>>> }
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> Note the "when" expression.  This means that the grouping has a strong
> >>>>> depency on where is it used.  We should try to avoid such a design.
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> Would this be better?   
> >>>> 
> >>>> OLD
> >>>>      when "../../../../tls";
> >>>> 
> >>>> NEW
> >>>> 	if-feature "tls-listen or tls-call-home";
> >>> 
> >>> Yes, but see below.
> >>> 
> >>> 
> >>>>> But should't this cert-to-name list be available when x509-certs are
> >>>>> used also with SSH?
> >>>> 
> >>>> Hmmm.  I'd assumed that, with RFC 6187, the username was still passed
> >>>> as its own field, but I see this in Section 4:
> >>>> 
> >>>>  For the purposes of user authentication, the mapping between
> >>>>  certificates and user names is left as an implementation and
> >>>>  configuration issue for implementers and system administrators.
> >>> 
> >>> If the username was used as identification it would mean that with a
> >>> valid cert I could present myself as any user!
> >>> 
> >>>> So you may be right about that.  I only ever looked at RFC 6187 from
> >>>> the perspective of the server presenting an IDevID certificate.  But,
> >>>> assuming it's true, then perhaps this:
> >>>> 
> >>>> NEWEST:
> >>>> 	if-feature "tls-listen or tls-call-home or sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
> >>> 
> >>> Ok.
> >>> 
> >>> This gives:
> >>> 
> >>> grouping netconf-server-grouping {
> >>>   description ...;
> >>>   container client-identification {
> >>>     description
> >>>       "Specifies a mapping through which clients MAY be identified
> >>>        (i.e., the NETCONF username) from a supplied certificate.
> >>>        Note that a client MAY alternatively be identified via an
> >>>        alternate authentication scheme.";
> >>>     container cert-maps {
> >>>       if-feature "tls-listen or tls-call-home or sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
> >> 
> >> Yes.
> >> 
> >>> But since the description of the "client-identification" says that it
> >>> is used only with certificates, perhaps that container's name should
> >>> reflect this, and the if-feature statement moved to that container?
> >>> Perhaps:
> >>> 
> >>>   container client-cert-identification
> >>>     if-feature "tls-listen or tls-call-home or sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs";
> >>> 
> >>> and also perhaps remove 'cert-maps', and use the cert-to-name grouping
> >>> directly here?
> >> 
> >> Good.  My only hesitation is that someday there may be a need for
> >> another way to identify clients, but that sounds too far out (even for
> >> me) to squabble over.  But a better name is needed.
> >> "cert-based-client-identification" would be more accurate, but that
> >> seems overly long.  Looking at a snippet of config might help...
> >> 
> >>      netconf-server-parameters : {
> >>        something-here : [
> >>          {
> >>            cert-to-name : { ... }
> >>            cert-to-name : { ... },
> >>            ...
> >>            cert-to-name : { ... }
> >>          }
> >>        ]
> >>      }
> >> 
> >> How about "cert-to-name-mappings"?  ( know, almost the same length,
> >> but half the number of syllables!).  But that name leaves out the word
> >> "identity", which is may be important in security circles, so maybe
> >> "client-identity-mappings"?
> > 
> > I think this name is as generic as "client-identification".  The best
> > so far imo is "cert-based-client-identification".  A bit long, but
> > descripitive.
> 
> Actually, I think we should go back to "client-identification" now that raw-public-key and pre-shared/pairwise-symmetric key (PSK) has been added as alternate ways that TLS clients and servers may identify themselves and authenticate peers.   Thus it seems that there is a need to map usernames from things other than just certificates.

I think I'll have to see how that works out.  But if the container is
more general than just client certificates, then the description text
needs to be updated.

> >>>>> The current data model for ssh specifies certs on
> >>>>> a per-user basis. But this requires lots of configuration in the case
> >>>>> that the cert encodes the user name (even though the name is in the
> >>>>> cert you have to configure each user on each device).  I suggest we
> >>>>> align the model for SSH with the TLS model for cert identification.
> >>>> 
> >>>> We certainly want to factor out configuration where possible.  I'd
> >>>> need to look into this more.  Perhaps you can send a diff?
> >>> 
> >>> Today we have under 'ssh-server-parameters/client-authentication':
> >>> 
> >>> +--:(local) {local-client-auth-supported}?
> >>>    +--rw users
> >>>       +--rw user* [name]
> >>>          +--rw name            string
> >>>          +--rw password?       ianach:crypt-hash
> >>>          +--rw host-keys!
> >>>          |  +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>          |     +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>          |     |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>          |     |     +--rw host-key*                 ct:ssh-host-key
> >>>          |     |     +--rw cert*                     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>          |     |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>          |     |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
> >> 
> >> Not to take away from your point, but the previous three lines don't
> >> exist in the model.
> >> 
> >>>          |     +--:(truststore) {truststore-supported,ssh-host-keys}?
> >>>          |        +--rw truststore-reference?   ts:host-keys-ref
> >>>          +--rw ca-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
> >>>          |  +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>          |     +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>          |     |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>          |     |     +--rw cert*                     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>          |     |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>          |     |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
> >>>          |     +--:(truststore) {truststore-supported,x509-certificates}?
> >>>          |        +--rw truststore-reference?   ts:certificates-ref
> >>>          +--rw client-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
> >>>             +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>                +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>                |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>                |     +--rw cert*                     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>                |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>                |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
> >>>                +--:(truststore) {truststore-supported,x509-certificates}?
> >>>                +--rw truststore-reference?   ts:certificates-ref
> >>> 
> >>> I think host-keys, ca-certs and client-certs should be moved out of
> >>> the user list:
> >>> 
> >>> +--:(local) {local-client-auth-supported}?
> >>>    +--rw users
> >>>    |  +--rw user* [name]
> >>>    |     +--rw name            string
> >>>    |     +--rw password?       ianach:crypt-hash
> >>>    +--rw host-keys!
> >>>    |  +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>    |     +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>    |     |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>    |     |     +--rw host-key*                 ct:ssh-host-key
> >>>    |     |     +--rw cert*                     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>    |     |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>    |     |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
> >> 
> >> Again, not to take away from your point, but the previous three lines
> >> don't exist in the model.
> >> 
> >>>    |     +--:(truststore) {truststore-supported,ssh-host-keys}?
> >>>    |        +--rw truststore-reference?   ts:host-keys-ref
> >>>    +--rw ca-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
> >>>    |  +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>    |     +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>    |     |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>    |     |     +--rw cert*                     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>    |     |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>    |     |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
> >>>    |     +--:(truststore) {truststore-supported,x509-certificates}?
> >>>    |        +--rw truststore-reference?   ts:certificates-ref
> >>>    +--rw client-certs! {sshcmn:ssh-x509-certs}?
> >>>       +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>          +--:(local) {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>          |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>          |     +--rw cert*                     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>          |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>          |        +-- expiration-date    yang:date-and-time
> >>>          +--:(truststore) {truststore-supported,x509-certificates}?
> >>>             +--rw truststore-reference?   ts:certificates-ref
> >> 
> >> I agree that "ca-certs" and "client-certs" should be pulled out (as
> >> they are in ietf-tls-server), but I'm unsure if "host-keys" can be, at
> >> least not unless we introduce something like "host-key-to-name" maps,
> >> right?
> >> 
> >> For now, I only pulled out "ca-certs" and "client-certs".
> > 
> > Hmm, I realize that I have misunderstood 'host-keys' here.  How
> > exactly is this supposed to be used?  This is the client
> > authentication part of a server.  How is the *host* key used here by
> > the server?   I mean, the client doesn't present a host key to the
> > server, so I don't understand what this is.
> 
> It seems that I've been overzealous with the term "host-key" here.  In SSH, a "host-key" is a special term for the server's public key.  Clients may also authenticate using a public key, but there isn't a special term for that case.   RFC 4252 states that clients can authenticate using "publickey", "password", and "hostbased".   Per RFC 6187, section 1, 1st paragraph, the "publickey" algorithm is is also used for X.509 certificates (e.g., x509v3-rsa2048-sha256).

So what is the conclusion?  Remove host-key here?  Or was the
intention that this is the user's public key?


/martin




> >>> But also here I think that the choice "local-or-external" isn't
> >>> ideal.  I think that a system that implements some "external"
> >>> mechanism should/would augement this data model with specific nodes
> >>> for that mechanism.  As a simplistic example:
> >>> 
> >>> augment /netconf-server/.../client-authentication {
> >>>   leaf use-host-keys-in-filesystem {
> >>>     leaf boolean;
> >>>   }
> >>> }
> >>> 
> >>> In this case, requiring the client to configure both this new leaf and
> >>> "client-auth-defined-elsewhere" seems redundant and non-intuitive.
> >> 
> >> Agreed.
> >> 
> >>> Another case is a system that *always* use the filesystem host keys.
> >>> It would simply just always do that, and again, requiring the client
> >>> to configure "client-auth-defined-elsewhere" seems incorrect.
> >> 
> >> Agreed.
> >> 
> >>> So my suggestion is to remove the choice "local-or-external" and
> >>> remove the external case, and instead document that (i) systems may
> >>> use some other hard-wired mechanism or (ii) other modules can augment
> >>> this container with additional control parameters for other
> >>> mechanisms.
> >> 
> >> Agree in principle, but unsure about implementation.  One thing
> >> important to me you didn't mention is having the "local" configuration
> >> gated by a "feature" statement.  So, do we float the
> >> "local-client-auth-supported" (renamed appropriately) up to the
> >> "client-authentication" container?  If so, would that incorrectly
> >> cover the "supported-authentication-methods" descendent?
> >> Suggestions?
> > 
> > Perhaps just add the if-feature to the containers "users", "ca-certs",
> > "client-certs"?
> 
> Sounds okay.  I've updated my local copy, in all of SSH, TLS, and HTTP.
> 
> 
> 
> >>>>> For TLS, the data model has the following structure:
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> +--rw netconf-server
> >>>>>   +--rw listen! {ssh-listen or tls-listen}?
> >>>>>      +--rw idle-timeout?   uint16
> >>>>>      +--rw endpoint* [name]
> >>>>>         +--rw name         string
> >>>>>         +--rw (transport)
> >>>>>            ...
> >>>>>            +--:(tls) {tls-listen}?
> >>>>> 
> >>>>>  [ reset indentation to make the diagram easier to read ]
> >>>>> 
> >>>>> +--rw tls
> >>>>>    +--rw tcp-server-parameters
> >>>>>    ...
> >>>>>    +--rw tls-server-parameters
> >>>>>    |  +--rw server-identity
> >>>>>          ...
> >>>>>    |  +--rw client-authentication!
> >>>>>    |  |  +--rw (required-or-optional)
> >>>>>    |  |  |  +--:(required)
> >>>>>    |  |  |  |  +--rw required?    empty
> >>>>>    |  |  |  +--:(optional)
> >>>>>    |  |  |     +--rw optional?    empty
> >>>>>    |  |  +--rw (local-or-external)
> >>>>>    |  |     +--:(local)  {local-client-auth-supported}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |  +--rw ca-certs!   {ts:x509-certificates}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |  +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     +--:(local)  {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     |     +--rw cert*   trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     |        +-- expiration-date
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     |                yang:date-and-time
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |     +--:(truststore)
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |              {truststore-supported,x509-certificates}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |        +--rw truststore-reference?
> >>>>>    |  |     |  |                ts:certificates-ref
> >>>>>    |  |     |  +--rw client-certs!  {ts:x509-certificates}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |     +--rw (local-or-truststore)
> >>>>>    |  |     |        +--:(local)  {local-definitions-supported}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |        |  +--rw local-definition
> >>>>>    |  |     |        |     +--rw cert*     trust-anchor-cert-cms
> >>>>>    |  |     |        |     +---n certificate-expiration
> >>>>>    |  |     |        |        +-- expiration-date
> >>>>>    |  |     |        |                yang:date-and-time
> >>>>>    |  |     |        +--:(truststore)
> >>>>>    |  |     |                 {truststore-supported,x509-certificates}?
> >>>>>    |  |     |           +--rw truststore-reference?
> >>>>>    |  |     |                   ts:certificates-ref
> >>>>>    |  |     +--:(external)
> >>>>>    |  |              {external-client-auth-supported}?
> >>>>>    |  |        +--rw client-auth-defined-elsewhere?
> >>>>>    |  |                empty
> >>>>>        ...
> >>>>>    +--rw netconf-server-parameters
> >>>>>       +--rw client-identification
> >>>>>          +--rw cert-maps
> >>>>>             +--rw cert-to-name* [id]
> >>>>>                +--rw id             uint32
> >>>>>                +--rw fingerprint
> >>>>>                |       x509c2n:tls-fingerprint
> >>>>>                +--rw map-type       identityref
> >>>>>                +--rw name           string
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>>> It is not clear how this is used by the server to end up either with
> >>>>> an authenticated user name or failed authentication.
> >>>> 
> >>>> Okay, let's fix that.
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>>> First of all, how is the "required-or-optional" choice used in a
> >>>>> NETCONF server?  What happens if an operation configures this to
> >>>>> "optional"?  (side note: why is this a choice of empty leafs instead
> >>>>> of a leaf?)
> >>>> 
> >>>> Hmmm, this 'choice' seems unneeded for NETCONF.  The "choice" is
> >>>> coming from the ietf-tls-server, and a similar "choice" is in
> >>>> ietf-http-server. It was put there, in part, for RESTCONF, as
> >>>> user-auth can occur at either (or both!) protocol layers...
> >>> 
> >>> Ok.  Yes, the RESTCONF auth mechanism is interesting.  Let's discuss
> >>> that in a separate thread.
> >> 
> >> Okay.  For now, I'll leave the "required-or-optional" in both
> >> ietf-tls-server and ietf-http-server.  However, to address the issue
> >> that it can never apply to NETCONF, it seems that a possible strategy
> >> would be to move both instances to augmentations defined in
> >> ietf-restconf-server...
> >> 
> >> That said, to go along with some of your thinking from above, it's not
> >> clear how an application would consume the "required-or-optional"
> >> configuration.  Case in point, in the RESTCONF server based product
> >> I'm working on, the configuration for each client, which is defined
> >> outside the restconf-server-grouping tree, has descendants nodes like
> >> "http-password" and "tls-trust-anchor", with meanings that, if
> >> defined, then the client MUST present said auth credentials at that
> >> protocol-layer.  IIRC, the code doesn't check these flags at all.
> >> 
> >> So, rather than moving both "required-or-optional" instances to
> >> augmentations in ietf-restconf-server, maybe they can just be deleted?
> > 
> > Yes I think so, altough I haven't yet studied the restconf model in
> > detail.
> 
> I've updated my local copy, in both TLS-server and HTTP-server.
> 
> 
> 
> >>>>> Second, I assume that the idea is that the server uses the config
> >>>>> params in "local-or-external" and the certificate presented by the
> >>>>> client and after this step is either accepted or rejected.  It is not
> >>>>> clear what is supposed to happen if someone configures
> >>>>> "client-auth-defined-elsewhere".  I think it is better to not define
> >>>>> this case, but (perhaps) keep the choice and explain that other
> >>>>> modules can augment additional config params here for other
> >>>>> authentication mechanisms.
> >>>> 
> >>>> Well that's just the thing, the goal is to enable user-auth to NOT be
> >>>> defined here.  As the description statement in ietf-tls-server says:
> >>>> 
> >>>>         "Configuring credentials externally enables applications
> >>>>          to place client authentication with client definitions,
> >>>>          rather then in a part of a data model principally
> >>>>          concerned with configuring the TLS transport.";
> >>> 
> >>> I totally agree with this.  I am questioning the solution.  See above
> >>> for my proposal.
> >> 
> >> Ack.
> >> 
> >> 
> >>>>> Next, my guess is that the intention is that if the cert was accepted
> >>>>> in the step above, it is checked in cert-to-name to see if a user name
> >>>>> can be derived.
> >>>> 
> >>>> Yes.
> >>>> 
> >>>> 
> >>>>> In another thread you mentioned that if a local cert is configured, it
> >>>>> seems redundant to also configure the cert as a fingerprint in
> >>>>> cert-to-name.  I'm not sure about this.  But perhaps you can use the
> >>>>> same "map-type" and "name" leafs in the "client-cert" container?  It
> >>>>> is not as easy for the "truststore-reference"; perhaps you'd have to
> >>>>> augment the truststore with these leafs in this case.
> >>>> 
> >>>> In context, that statement I made before is a relatively minor
> >>>> objection.  That said, I don't understand your proposal, are you
> >>>> suggesting to recreate the essence of 'cert-to-name'?  Another idea I
> >>>> had was that the fingerprint could be in a "union" with also a
> >>>> truststore-reference, which is only mildly better...
> >>> 
> >>> Aha, now I understand your suggestion of making fingerprint optional.
> >>> I agree that this could work.  However, I assume it must be used with
> >>> care.  If you know for sure that a successful result from the
> >>> authentication mechanism means that CA cert X has been used, you can
> >>> save some typing by not configuring the fingerprint of X.  So the
> >>> question is if it is worth it?
> >> 
> >> Yes, saving typing is the gist of it, but I don't think handling with
> >> care is needed or, rather, it's no more care.  As I understand it, a
> >> fingerprint would be redundant in the common case, i.e., most configs
> >> would not have to define a fingerprint, so the optimization seems
> >> worth it to me.
> > 
> > It would be interesting to hear other opinions on this, esp. from
> > security people.  Personally I can accept both alternatives.
> 
> I'll discuss the issue in the presentation.
> 
> Kent // contributor
> 
> 
> > 
> >> Separately, be aware that calculating an x509c2n:tls-fingerprint is
> >> not a simple copy/paste.  That is, the command `openssl x509 -in
> >> CERT.pem -noout -sha256 -fingerprint` is close, but not exactly what
> >> is needed.
> > 
> > Right; you have to prefix this fingerprint with "04:".
> > 
> > 
> > /martin
>