Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Thu, 04 April 2019 17:12 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 17:12:36 +0000
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Cc: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>
To: "Rob Wilton (rwilton)" <rwilton@cisco.com>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden
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> [RW]
> I think that is bad practice for a server to inject configuration into <running>.  It makes it ambiguous as to which entity really owns the configuration.   I think that what is in <running> should be owned by the client, not the server.  I’m not saying that nobody does this, but I don’t believe that it is the cleanest solution.
> 

We're not talking about the server doing something on its own accord here; this would be a direct result of a client request.  Abstractly, such can be considered configuration as legitimate as configuration provided by any other means.

Kent // contributor