Re: [netconf] updates to client/server drafts

[Martin Bjorklund <[e-mail]>]

Kent Watsen <[e-mail]> wrote:
> 
> >>> I am strictly against hiding actions by encoding 'verbs' in an ad-hoc
> >>> data format. I rather not support creation of keys on the device.
> >> 
> >> Remember we had this cases:
> >> 
> >> 1.  upload of keys
> >> 2a. generation of keys on the box that will go into hardware protected
> >>    storage (and never be accessible)
> >> 2b. generation of keys on the box that will be stored on disk
> >>    (and never be accessible over the mgmt interface)
> >> 3.  generation of keys on the box that become (protected)
> >> configuration
> 
> This list is missing cases #1 and #3 described here:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/eRDvDhOHikEq4fRJJGj8dD7uIcc
> <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/eRDvDhOHikEq4fRJJGj8dD7uIcc>.

#1 (pre-existing key in hw) is orthogonal to the pain points we have
here; it should be possible to handle this case.

#3 (upload of hidden key) should also be straight forward with an
action.


> Also, we currently make no distinction between (2a) and (2b) - hidden
> is hidden, however it's implemented.

I know, but the discussion seems to imply that this would be useful and
it seems trivial to support.


> >> I think the previous version of the draft (with YANG actions) handles
> >> 1 and 2 (a and b with trivial updates).
> >> 
> >> It is only (3) that we don't have a solution for that everybody
> >> accepts.
> >> 
> >> So perhaps we should solve 1 and 2a and 2b, and publish that, and
> >> leave 3 for the future?
> > 
> > This may be a way to move forward. In 2a and 2b, will there be a way
> > to remove a generated key via the mgmt interface or do I have to take
> > a bigger hammer to accomplish this?
> 
> I object to reverting to the approach that doesn't have the key's
> 3-tuple (algorithm, public key, private key) marked as mandatory true,
> our doing that before was unhelpful.

I need to go back and re-read (again, I just read all threads on this
issue) some mails to understand what this means.


> I was hoping that the "verbs"
> approach could leap over the impasse but, if Juergen is strictly
> against it, then we should go back to the approach described here:
> https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/P-xcpHqUNq3LfX5meOCpNQMJusY
> <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/P-xcpHqUNq3LfX5meOCpNQMJusY>,
> for which a draft was never published.
> 
> In the previous link, search for "Now let's discuss what this action
> does" and note the two options: (1) is more user-friendly, but one
> that Martin appears to be strictly against

Yes, and Andy and Rob (at least).  And I do not agree that it is user
friendly at all!

> and so perhaps (2) is all
> we can agree on, and yes, there would need to be a third (not
> mentioned) action to delete the key from <operational> (presumably
> after having deleted the same from <running>).  Yes, it is less
> friendly, if you want more friendly, then let's do (1).  I'll update
> the draft shortly based on the less-friendly approach (2).

I don't think (2) is the right solution either.  I think the previous
version of the draft was very close to a workable solution.

> That said, I'm also okay with giving up (for now) trying to enable a
> client request the server to generate a key (hidden or not) or request
> the server to install a hidden key [note: these are #2 and #3 in my
> first link above].

I don't it is necessary to give up this.

IMO the only problematic use case is "let the device generate a key
that then becomes part of the config".  If we avoid that I think we
can handle the other cases.


> I would support this less complete solution
> because it still supports basic configuration (#0) and
> manufacturer-generated keys for, e.g., IDevID certificates (#1), and
> thus a passable go-to-market solution.  If folks don't like the update
> per the previous paragraph, then this looks like a good fallback.


/martin