Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com> Wed, 18 September 2019 20:06 UTC
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Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 22:06:38 +0200
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From: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> wrote: > [moving Russ and Sean to BCC, per Rich's action] > > > > > Minor: Does the “string” in the description above mean “ASCII string” > > or “binary string”, RFC 4251 seemingly uses both definitions? > > I don't know, but this is the language found for the "key-data" leaf > in RFC 7317 (i.e., we've been living with this definition for awhile) So the definition is: leaf key-data { type binary; mandatory true; description "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.: string certificate or public key format identifier byte[n] key/certificate data."; The textual representation of a binary in YANG is base64 encoded. As it happens, this is exactly the same as OpenSSH uses for its keys. So the open ssh key can be copy/pasted into the NC/RC XML/JSON. /martin > > > > Is putting the encrypted keys into DER-encoded OneSymmetricKey > > obviously the right thing to do? Are there other choices? > > > Yes, if there was one thing that came out of my discussion with Russ > and Sean is that OneSymmetricKey and OneAsymmetricKey SHOULD be used > for encrypting key data. Anything else would be a BIG effort. > > The real question is if we should also use the One*Key structures for > unencrypted keys, which could help some ways, but I think that it's > better to use the values provided by OpenSSL command line. This > approach pushes the complexity of using the One*Key structures to just > the "advanced" case of when encryption is needed and, besides, it > would primarily be for the NC/RC server to generate/parse; clients > would rarely encrypt a key themselves, the only case I can think of > when they might would be for the RMA workflow we discussed a few weeks > back. > > > Kent > >
- [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- [netconf] FW: crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Holland, Jake
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] [Taps] crypto-types fallback strate… tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Wang Haiguang
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund