Re: [netconf] The maintenance of the algorithm identifiers in draft-ietf-crypto-types

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Fri, 26 April 2019 14:25 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 14:25:46 +0000
In-Reply-To: <20190425214516.n2fi3bc3volpv5lr@anna.jacobs.jacobs-university.de>
Cc: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>, wang.haiguang.shieldlab@huawei.com, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>
To: Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] The maintenance of the algorithm identifiers in draft-ietf-crypto-types
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> On Apr 25, 2019, at 5:45 PM, Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de> wrote:
> 
> On Thu, Apr 25, 2019 at 09:21:43PM +0000, Kent Watsen wrote:
>> 
>> In the meanwhile, what's the stop-gap solution?   - crypto-types
>> shouldn't be blocked on YANG Next...
>> 
> 
> What we have been doing so far is publishing identities / enumerations
> without having a common way for implementations to declare the subset
> they do support. This seems reasonable since once we add a common
> mechanism to report the subset actually implemented, we do not have to
> go back and revise the definitions of identities and enumerations.

Sounds right, with the clarification that crypto-types should have identities for all (within reason) known algorithms, even if deprecated or obsolete, and that for those algorithms that are deprecated or obsolete, the identity's "status" statement should be set to "deprecated" or "obsolete" accordingly.

Haiguang, can you please point the i2nsf group to this thread?

Thanks,
Kent