Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
Per Hedeland <per@hedeland.org> Wed, 18 September 2019 21:54 UTC
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To: "Schönwälder, Jürgen" <J.Schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>
Cc: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>, "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>, "rifaat.ietf@gmail.com" <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com>
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From: Per Hedeland <per@hedeland.org>
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Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2019 23:54:41 +0200
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
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On 2019-09-18 23:19, Schönwälder, Jürgen wrote: > On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 10:53:09PM +0200, Per Hedeland wrote: >> On 2019-09-18 22:29, Schönwälder, Jürgen wrote: >>> On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 10:06:38PM +0200, Martin Bjorklund wrote: >>>> Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> wrote: >>>>> [moving Russ and Sean to BCC, per Rich's action] >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> Minor: Does the string in the description above mean ASCII string >>>>>> or binary string, RFC 4251 seemingly uses both definitions? >>>>> >>>>> I don't know, but this is the language found for the "key-data" leaf >>>>> in RFC 7317 (i.e., we've been living with this definition for awhile) >>>> >>>> So the definition is: >>>> >>>> leaf key-data { >>>> type binary; >>>> mandatory true; >>>> description >>>> "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as >>>> specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.: >>>> >>>> string certificate or public key format >>>> identifier >>>> byte[n] key/certificate data."; >>>> >>>> The textual representation of a binary in YANG is base64 encoded. As >>>> it happens, this is exactly the same as OpenSSH uses for its keys. So >>>> the open ssh key can be copy/pasted into the NC/RC XML/JSON. >>>> >>> >>> My public ssh keys usually start like this: >>> >>> ssh-rsa AAAA... >>> >>> Looking at RFC 4251, it seems to me that 'string' is encoded with a >>> length prefix, followed by n bytes of key data. This means the start >>> in hex would be something like this: >>> >>> 00 00 00 07 73 73 68 2d 72 73 61 >>> >>> If I base64 encode this, I won't get what I quoted above. >> >> Are you sure? I don't have a handy base64 encoder for "space-separated >> octets represented as hex numbers", but going in the other direction >> with the initial part of my public ssh key (ssh-rsa), using the Linux >> 'base64' command and converting the result to "space-separated octets >> represented as hex numbers" gives: >> >> $ echo AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EA | base64 -d | od -t x1 >> 0000000 00 00 00 07 73 73 68 2d 72 73 61 00 >> >> Seems to agree with what you have. >> > > Aha. So the 'ssh-rsa ' part in my key file needs to be stripped as it > is actually redundant (but still its there in my file). Right, it's in mine too of course - I stripped it without thinking, but realized after posting that this might be the reason that your encoding didn't match. (There is also normally a trailing <user>@<host> after the actual key.) > In the RFC > 7317 YANG model, this string seems to go into the 'algorithm' > leaf. All good and usable. Yes - and hopefully a server implementing it will reject 'key-data' input with the leading 'ssh-rsa ' (or any other "key type", which all seem to include one or more '-') - the '-' is not a valid base64 character (nor is space, but base64 decoders are often "liberal" with whitespace). > (I wonder what happens if the two algorithm names do not match, time > to run some experiments on my ssh implementation...) Ditto for a server implementing RFC 7317... --Per
- [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- [netconf] FW: crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Holland, Jake
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] [Taps] crypto-types fallback strate… tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Wang Haiguang
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund