Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments
Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Thu, 14 November 2019 13:40 UTC
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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2019 13:40:40 +0000
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To: Martin Bjorklund <mbj@tail-f.com>
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Subject: Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments
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Hi Martin, >> The issue presents itself when configuring the "server-identity" in >> ietf-ssh-server, whether a local definition or a reference to a key in >> the keystore. A "must" expression could be used to constrain the >> supported key-formats allowed. Our modules could hardcode this for >> all implementations > > Ok. This is worth exploring imo. I added FIXME comments into all of ietf-[ssh/tls]-[client/server]. >>> You're using a normal config false list for this (which is fine), but >>> I don't think you can use a single global list like this. >> >> I don't understand this statement. > > My point is really just that a single global list like this is not > sufficient. It doesn't matter if "feature" has problems; a single > global config false list is not sufficient for what you're trying to > do. True. But how can we define a way to get a list per instance? Should there be a "config false" list wherever the "algorithm" node appears (i.e., put the list into the crypto-type groupings having the algorithm node?) >> Not true or, rather, the intention is to support native encoding >> formats, including DER vs PEM, and CMS vs multi-part PEM. > > But that would be different key-format identities, right? I think so, yes. > The issue > here is about what the specfic format is for ssh-public-key-format. > The format I suggest is also already used in RFC 7317, as was pointed > out before by someone else. That is the binary encoding for the on-the-wire public key. Yes, for the binary encoding, this is a great option. But I thought a goal was to try to use native tool formats when possible. Not that we want to hardcode to OpenSSH, but `man ssh-keygen`: -m key_format Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export) conversion options. The supported key formats are: ``RFC4716'' (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), ``PKCS8'' (PEM PKCS8 public key) or ``PEM'' (PEM public key). The default conversion format is ``RFC4716''. Setting a format of ``PEM'' when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format. >>>> That said, if you refer to the link I provided at top, it is my belief >>>> that the "key-format" node may be extended to support alternate >>>> encodings (e.g., DER vs PEM and, potentially, CMS vs multi-part PEM). >>>> To this end, perhaps we could support both the 4716 and 4253 formats. >>> >>> Do we really want to go there? This is already quite complex, and >>> having a multitude of optional formats for the same thing may make >>> things even more complex, to understand and get right. >> >> Binary formats (e.g., DER) are fundamental, but some raised usability >> concerns > > Do you have a pointer to this? There was an email from Juergen a few months back. >> , hence the exploration. As for complexity, how do we know >> until we try? > > I think we _are_ trying now... Fair, but there's yet to be a concrete proposal for how to support, e.g., multi-part PEM encoding and, in particular, how it is distinguished from the PEM encoding of the equivalent CMS. Presumably it's just another identity, but there maybe more to it... Kent // contributor
- [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types and keystore comments Martin Bjorklund