Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Thu, 04 April 2019 17:24 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Thu, 4 Apr 2019 17:24:17 +0000
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Subject: Re: [netconf] ietf crypto types - permanently hidden
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>> We have always said no, but the reasoning is unclear.  What are the
>> specific objections and is there anyway to alleviate them?
>> 
> 
> If editing of all configuration can be done with a single edit-data
> (or edit-config) operation, you simplify the world and you enable
> generic implementations.
> 
> Once you build silos of data that can only be manipulated with special
> purpose operations, you say goodbye to the idea of generic client
> libraries.

Fair, so what can we do to ensure this doesn't spiral out of control?

Clearly there is some line being crossed here (a Security best practice)
that is driving this.   Could we add that such use MUST only be done in 
order to resolve a Security best practice?

That said, I think your fear is unwarranted.  I do not believe that folks
would rush to defined 1000s of RPCs.   It seems that such use would
be done only in extenuating circumstances.

And, besides, so what?  Why do we care if people do stupid things?
Do we feel that our obligation to prevent people from doing stupid
things is more important than enabling people to do smart things?

Kent