[netconf] FW: crypto-types fallback strategy
"Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com> Tue, 24 September 2019 20:02 UTC
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From: "Salz, Rich" <rsalz@akamai.com>
To: "Holland, Jake" <jholland@akamai.com>
CC: "netconf@ietf.org" <netconf@ietf.org>
Thread-Topic: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy
Thread-Index: AQHVaNxGVhFlbERW30moo9Q8WhnpJqc7VCKA
Date: Tue, 24 Sep 2019 20:02:01 +0000
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Archived-At: <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/netconf/xhzZaQiaHjY7QGiuBKeazGq7d6U>
Subject: [netconf] FW: crypto-types fallback strategy
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Jake, As the author of the draft referenced below, do you care to comment? The crypto-types document in the netconf WG is undergoing some pretty drastic surgery. On 9/24/19, 4:50 AM, "tom petch" <ietfc@btconnect.com> wrote: Going back a bit, since this is a more generic comment, I get a different, simpler perspective in draft-jholland-taps-api-yang which has me wondering just how complicated this needs to be for it to be useful in other WGs. The I-D defines identity security-algorithm {description "Base identity for security algorithms." identity cipher-suite { base security-algorithm;description "Base identity for security cipher suites."; identity signature-algorithm {base security-algorithm; description "Base identity for security signature algorithms."; identity ed25519 {base signature-algorithm; identity TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 { base cipher-suite; and grouping security-credentials { leaf identity { type string; leaf trust-ca { type string; leaf algorithm { type identityref {base security-algorithm; leaf pre-shared-key { type string; leaf private-key { type string; leaf private-key-callback-handle {type string; leaf public-key {type string; (No SSH but that does not surprise me:-) Again a more general comment, the IETF often starts simple and adds lots later, which sometimes goes wrong because no allowance was made for slotting in extras, but an approach which, I think, more often leads to successful adoption. Thus will TAPS consider using draft-ietf-netconf-crypto-types or will they RYO? Tom Petch ----- Original Message ----- From: <Schönwälder>; "Jürgen" <J.Schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de> To: "Rob Wilton (rwilton)" <rwilton@cisco.com> Cc: "Russ Housley" <housley@vigilsec.com>; <netconf@ietf.org>; "Sean Turner" <sean@sn3rd.com>; "Rifaat Shekh-Yusef" <rifaat.ietf@gmail.com> Sent: Wednesday, September 18, 2019 5:36 PM > On Wed, Sep 18, 2019 at 03:37:14PM +0000, Rob Wilton (rwilton) wrote: > > >From the gist of the discussion, the punch list appears to be: > > > > - revert back to using identities, as they were in the -08 revision. > > - only define base identities for what's needed immediately for TLS and SSH and keystore key-encryption. > > - define these base identities in distinct YANG modules > > - have each identity's description statement indicate what the binary key data is encoded. > > [RW] > > I think that this matches my view, except for "define these base identities in distinct YANG modules". I don't feel particularly strongly about this, but I was thinking that the base identities would still be defined in crypto-types.yang, which might help keep the import references simple. > > I tend to agree that sometimes less modules is more. For me, the > problem is likely more that I am not entirely sure what the proper > base types would be, which may depend on what exactly they are used > for. I guess I wait until I see the description text... > > > A bit separate from the above, but still in mind: > > > > - specify that all TLS public-keys are a DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo structure > > - specify that all SSH public-keys are a "ssh-public-key-type" type (see below) > > - specify that all encrypted symmetric keys are a DER-encoded OneSymmetricKey structure > > - specify that all encrypted asymmetric keys are a DER-encoded OneAsymmetricKey structure > > I would check what is commonly used in existing configuration > interfaces. We are not inventing the wheel here. And whatever we > define better is usable with existing implementations and tools. > > > The "ssh-public-key" type would be defined as: > > > > typedef ssh-public-key-type { > > type binary; > > mandatory true; > > description > > "The binary public key data for this SSH key, as > > specified by RFC 4253, Section 6.6, i.e.: > > > > string certificate or public key format > > identifier > > byte[n] key/certificate data."; > > reference > > "RFC 4253: The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport > > Layer Protocol"; > > } > > The SSH implementations that I use have the binary key data rendered > in ASCII. In fact, the whole key record is rendered in ASCII. I > strongly suggest to use formats that are well established. > > /js > > -- > Juergen Schoenwaelder Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH > Phone: +49 421 200 3587 Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany > Fax: +49 421 200 3103 <https://www.jacobs-university.de/> > > _______________________________________________ > netconf mailing list > netconf@ietf.org > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netconf _______________________________________________ netconf mailing list netconf@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netconf
- [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Per Hedeland
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- [netconf] FW: crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Holland, Jake
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] [Taps] crypto-types fallback strate… tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Rob Wilton (rwilton)
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy tom petch
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Wang Haiguang
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Salz, Rich
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Schönwälder
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Kent Watsen
- Re: [netconf] crypto-types fallback strategy Martin Bjorklund