Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support

Vijay Devarapalli <vijay.devarapalli@azairenet.com> Mon, 10 September 2007 02:47 UTC

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Date: Sun, 09 Sep 2007 19:47:08 -0700
From: Vijay Devarapalli <vijay.devarapalli@azairenet.com>
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To: Sri Gundavelli <sgundave@cisco.com>, 'Alper Yegin' <alper.yegin@yegin.org>
Subject: Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
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Sri,

I agree with "SHOULD" for using IPsec and "MUST" for supporting IPsec on 
the MAG and the LMA.

If thats the consensus, we need to modify a few sentences in the draft.

In section 4, replace

>    The signaling messages, Proxy Binding Update and Proxy Binding
>    Acknowledgement, exchanged between the mobile access gateway and the
>    local mobility anchor MUST be protected using IPsec [RFC-4301] and
>    using the established security association between them.  The
>    security association of the specific mobile node for which the
>    signaling message is initiated is not required for protecting these
>    messages.

with

    The signaling messages, Proxy Binding Update and Proxy Binding
    Acknowledgement, exchanged between the mobile access gateway and the
    local mobility anchor MUST be protected using security associations
    established between them. The security association of the specific
    mobile node for which the signaling message is initiated is not
    required for protecting these messages.

We need the MUST above since we have to say that the proxy BU and proxy 
BAck must be protected, irrespective of whether IPsec or some other 
mechanism is used.

Add one sentence that says

    The mobile access gateway and the local mobility anchor MUST
    implement IPsec for protecting the Proxy Mobile IPv6 signaling
    messages [RFC-4301].

The paragraph that comes after already uses "SHOULD" for using ESP.

>    IPsec ESP [RFC-4303] in transport mode with mandatory integrity
>    protection SHOULD be used for protecting the signaling messages.
>    Confidentiality protection of these messages is not required.

Hope that is sufficient.

Vijay


Sri Gundavelli wrote:
> I want some comments on this issue raised by Alper.
> 
> 
> Also, if I interpret Sec 5.1 [3775], the IPSec is being
> mandated, only the use of IPsec ESP is optional. 
> 
> --------
> 5.1.  Binding Updates to Home Agents
> 
>    The mobile node and the home agent MUST use an IPsec security
>    association to protect the integrity and authenticity of the Binding
>    Updates and Acknowledgements.  Both the mobile nodes and the home
>    agents MUST support and SHOULD use the Encapsulating Security Payload
>    (ESP) [6] header in transport mode and MUST use a non-NULL payload
>    authentication algorithm to provide data origin authentication,
>    connectionless integrity and optional anti-replay protection.  Note
>    that Authentication Header (AH) [5] is also possible but for brevity
>    not discussed in this specification.
> -------
> 
> 
> I'm confused, should the draft say 
> 
> "Both LMA and MAG MUST implement IPsec" and
> "all the signaling messages SHOULD be protected using IPSec".
> 
> Will this ok, when reviewed by the security folks ?
> 
> or mandate IPsec for this specification and let other draft
> relax this in the presence of an alternative approach ?
> 
> Please comment.
> 
> 
> Sri
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Alper Yegin [mailto:alper.yegin@yegin.org] 
>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2007 1:41 AM
>> To: 'Sri Gundavelli'; netlmm@ietf.org
>> Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
>>
>>> The issue was related to the use of MUST clause in specifying
>>> the IPSec requirement for Proxy Mobile IPv6 protocol. Alper
>>> was suggesting that we relax that requirement and potentially
>>> leave a room for Auth Option support in future.
>> Actually, I didn't mean it specifically for Auth Option. It 
>> can be anything.
>> Given that the security is handled by a separate protocol, 
>> why lock it down
>> to "IPsec", when some other protocol (Auth Option being one 
>> example) cannot
>> be used.
>>
>>> But, as most people agreed and as supported by Jari, this can
>> My understanding was the opposite, especially about Jari's statement.
>>
>>> always be changed in future when the support for new security
>>> mechanisms such as Auth Option are defined for Proxy Mobile IPv6
>>> and that specific document can always modify this requirement.
>>> So, no changes will be made to the document on this issue.
>> What if Auth Option is good enough as written?
>> What if a document in another SDO defines the alternative security
>> mechanism?
>>
>> For the type of interop we are seeking in IETF, "MUST 
>> implement" is good
>> enough. "MUST use" is not necessary.
>>
>> Alper
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>> Regards
>>> Sri
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> netlmm mailing list
>>> netlmm@ietf.org
>>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> 
> _______________________________________________
> netlmm mailing list
> netlmm@ietf.org
> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm


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