RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support

"Ahmad Muhanna" <amuhanna@nortel.com> Mon, 10 September 2007 12:56 UTC

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Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
Date: Mon, 10 Sep 2007 07:56:31 -0500
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From: Ahmad Muhanna <amuhanna@nortel.com>
To: "Narayanan, Vidya" <vidyan@qualcomm.com>, Sri Gundavelli <sgundave@cisco.com>, Julien Laganier <julien.IETF@laposte.net>, netlmm@ietf.org
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Hope this is never too late.

My understanding is that for any implementation to claim compliancy to
any RFC, that implementation MUST implement all "MUST" and "SHOULD".
Having said that, I am not sure why we need this distinction of "MUST
implement IPsec" and "SHOULD use IPsec", that is exactly the meaning of
"SHOULD use IPsec".


Regards,
Ahmad
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Narayanan, Vidya [mailto:vidyan@qualcomm.com] 
> Sent: Friday, September 07, 2007 2:27 PM
> To: Sri Gundavelli; Julien Laganier; netlmm@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> 
> All,
> On this topic, I believe we must have a mandatory to 
> implement mechanism specified for standards track 
> publication.  We can leave the use at "RECOMMENDED" or 
> "SHOULD", but, we need a "MUST" on what the LMA and MAG need 
> to implement.  
> 
> I had run this by the security directorate at the Chicago 
> meeting and my understanding is that as long as we have "MUST 
> implement IPsec" and "SHOULD use IPsec", it would be fine.  
> 
> In other words, the SHOULD vs. MUST that we want to place on 
> using IPsec can be discussed, but, the "MUST" on 
> implementation is non-negotiable.  
> 
> This is inline with my understanding on what we need to state 
> for a complete specification.  Given that channel security of 
> signaling messages is mandatory, unless we have at least one 
> common denominator that the MAG and LMA implementors will 
> implement, we cannot ensure interoperability.  If they 
> support multiple common mechanisms and chose to use something 
> other than IPsec, that's fine - hence, the "SHOULD" on usage. 
> 
> Hope that helps. 
> 
> Thanks,
> Vidya
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Sri Gundavelli [mailto:sgundave@cisco.com]
> > Sent: Friday, September 07, 2007 10:10 AM
> > To: 'Julien Laganier'; netlmm@ietf.org
> > Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> > 
> > Hi Julien,
> > 
> >  
> > 
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: julien laganier [mailto:julien.laganier@gmail.com] On
> > Behalf Of
> > > Julien Laganier
> > > Sent: Friday, September 07, 2007 5:29 AM
> > > To: netlmm@ietf.org
> > > Cc: Sri Gundavelli; 'Alper Yegin'
> > > Subject: Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> > > 
> > > Hi Sri,
> > > 
> > > On Thursday 06 September 2007, Sri Gundavelli wrote:
> > > > I'm confused, should the draft say
> > > >
> > > > "Both LMA and MAG MUST implement IPsec" and "all the signaling 
> > > > messages SHOULD be protected using IPSec".
> > > >
> > > > Will this ok, when reviewed by the security folks ?
> > > >
> > > > or mandate IPsec for this specification and let other 
> draft relax 
> > > > this in the presence of an alternative approach ?
> > > >
> > > > Please comment.
> > > 
> > > Somehow, "MUST implement" and "SHOULD use" together seems a bit 
> > > tautologic.
> > > 
> > > To me "SHOULD use" is sufficient since it covers both of the two 
> > > possibles cases:
> > > 
> > > - deployment follows the SHOULD recommendation, it uses IPsec to 
> > > protect PMIPv6, in which case it supports it, since it's
> > using it :),
> > > or
> > > 
> > > - deployment ignores the SHOULD recommendation, does not
> > uses IPSec,
> > > in which case it is useless to implement it since it's not used...
> > > 
> > > I'd prefer having "MUST protect integrity of signalling
> > messages, and
> > > SHOULD use IPsec ESP to protect integrity of those messages".
> > > We might
> > > also add "MAY use IPsec AH".
> > > 
> > 
> > 
> > I agree. I'm not against allowing other approaches. I'm only 
> > concerned, if we can leave the draft saying, "MUST protect 
> integrity 
> > of signalling messages", with out specifying IPsec or some other 
> > approach. If that will pass the security review. We may 
> have to state 
> > that IPsec MUST be used or some other approach, say 
> Auth-Option MUST 
> > be used. Not sure, if we can leave this blank.
> > 
> > Sri
> > 
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > netlmm mailing list
> > netlmm@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> > 
> 
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