[netlmm] Question on security model

"DE JUAN HUARTE FEDERICO" <Federico.De_Juan_Huarte@alcatel-lucent.fr> Tue, 11 September 2007 14:03 UTC

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From: DE JUAN HUARTE FEDERICO <Federico.De_Juan_Huarte@alcatel-lucent.fr>
To: Ahmad Muhanna <amuhanna@nortel.com>
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Subject: [netlmm] Question on security model
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Hi Ahmad,

you're right that I was shamelessly abusing of the thread
I apologize for that: I've changed the subject this time

As I said, I understand that the security model has already been discussed and the decision has been to go with a per-node SA
I would appreciate if anybody could send me a pointer to any record capturing the discussion that led to this decision

More concretely, I would like to find out:
   - (first and most important) how the threat of a compromised MAG is addressed with the per-node SA model?
   - did the discussion take into account the fact that MAG and LMA may be located in different administrative domains?
   - did the discussion take place before or after the decision to move away from DT solution to PMIP?

Thanks

federico

-----Message d'origine-----
De : Ahmad Muhanna [mailto:amuhanna@nortel.com] 
Envoyé : lundi 10 septembre 2007 20:08
À : DE JUAN HUARTE FEDERICO; Vijay Devarapalli
Cc : netlmm@ietf.org
Objet : RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support

Hi Federico,

The issue of using a per-Node SA has been discussed long time ago and reached consensus. This thread is not about the use of Per-Node vs. Per-MN SA. It is about relaxing the mandate of the use IPsec to "MUST implement" and SHOULD use"
That is it.

I Hope this address your concern.

Regards,
Ahmad
 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: DE JUAN HUARTE FEDERICO
> [mailto:Federico.De_Juan_Huarte@alcatel-lucent.fr]
> Sent: Monday, September 10, 2007 12:44 PM
> To: Vijay Devarapalli; Muhanna, Ahmad (RICH1:2H10)
> Cc: netlmm@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> 
> Hi,
> 
> I am slowly catching up with NETLMM and I acknowledge that in some 
> aspects (e.g. security model) I'm definitely late
> 
> I understand from this email that, in this group it has already been 
> decided to go for a per-node security model I followed the discussion 
> about the security model in a PMIP solution in a given forum (Wimax) 
> some years ago, and then it was considered that a per-node security 
> model was was not sufficient The main argument I remember is the 
> threat of the MAG being compromised and indiscriminately allocating 
> resources from the LMA This is especially worrisome when the the MAG 
> and the LMA belong to 2 different administrative domains Has this 
> problem been addressed in this group?
> 
> Thanks
> 
> federico
> 
> 
>  
> 
> -----Message d'origine-----
> De : Vijay Devarapalli [mailto:vijay.devarapalli@azairenet.com]
> Envoyé : lundi 10 septembre 2007 17:03 À : Ahmad Muhanna Cc : 
> netlmm@ietf.org Objet : Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> 
> Ahmad,
> 
> I don't believe the security model of using just one security 
> association between the MAG and the LMA for protecting the proxy BU 
> and Proxy BAck changes irrespective of whether IPsec or RFC 4285 is 
> used. So
>   I don't agree with the suggested change.
> 
> Vijay
> 
> Ahmad Muhanna wrote:
> >  
> >> Subject: Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> >>
> >> Sri,
> >>
> >> I agree with "SHOULD" for using IPsec and "MUST" for
> supporting IPsec
> >> on the MAG and the LMA.
> >>
> >> If thats the consensus, we need to modify a few sentences in the 
> >> draft.
> >>
> >> In section 4, replace
> >>
> >>>    The signaling messages, Proxy Binding Update and Proxy Binding
> >>>    Acknowledgement, exchanged between the mobile access
> >> gateway and the
> >>>    local mobility anchor MUST be protected using IPsec
> >> [RFC-4301] and
> >>>    using the established security association between them.  The
> >>>    security association of the specific mobile node for which the
> >>>    signaling message is initiated is not required for
> >> protecting these
> >>>    messages.
> >> with
> >>
> >>     The signaling messages, Proxy Binding Update and Proxy Binding
> >>     Acknowledgement, exchanged between the mobile access
> gateway and
> >> the
> >>     local mobility anchor MUST be protected using security 
> >> associations
> >>     established between them. The security association of
> the specific
> >>     mobile node for which the signaling message is initiated is not
> >>     required for protecting these messages.
> >>
> >> We need the MUST above since we have to say that the proxy BU and 
> >> proxy BAck must be protected, irrespective of whether
> IPsec or some
> >> other mechanism is used.
> > 
> > [Ahmad]
> > Hi Vijay,
> > 
> > As far as I remember, the whole security concept of using a
> per-Node
> > SA for PMIPv6 was based on the use of IPsec. Although, I
> see why you
> > proposed the text but I still see a problem here. For example, the 
> > above text allows the use of an authentication option
> similar to FA-HA
> > AE to secure the P-BU/P-BA.
> > 
> > Now, since allowing a per-Node SA to be used in PMIPv6 was based on 
> > the use of IPsec, I believe we clearly need to keep that as part of 
> > the spec text.
> > 
> > What about the following slight modification to what you
> just proposed:
> > 
> >     The signaling messages, Proxy Binding Update and Proxy Binding
> >     Acknowledgement, exchanged between the mobile access
> gateway and the
> >     local mobility anchor MUST be protected using a
> security association
> >     established between them. If IPsec is used, the security 
> > association
> > 
> >     of the specific mobile node for which the signaling message is 
> > initiated
> >     is not required for protecting these messages.
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Ahmad
> > 
> >> Add one sentence that says
> >>
> >>     The mobile access gateway and the local mobility anchor MUST
> >>     implement IPsec for protecting the Proxy Mobile IPv6 signaling
> >>     messages [RFC-4301].
> >>
> >> The paragraph that comes after already uses "SHOULD" for using ESP.
> >>
> >>>    IPsec ESP [RFC-4303] in transport mode with mandatory integrity
> >>>    protection SHOULD be used for protecting the signaling
> messages.
> >>>    Confidentiality protection of these messages is not required.
> >> Hope that is sufficient.
> >>
> >> Vijay
> >>
> >>
> >> Sri Gundavelli wrote:
> >>> I want some comments on this issue raised by Alper.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Also, if I interpret Sec 5.1 [3775], the IPSec is being
> >> mandated, only
> >>> the use of IPsec ESP is optional.
> >>>
> >>> --------
> >>> 5.1.  Binding Updates to Home Agents
> >>>
> >>>    The mobile node and the home agent MUST use an IPsec security
> >>>    association to protect the integrity and authenticity of
> >> the Binding
> >>>    Updates and Acknowledgements.  Both the mobile nodes
> and the home
> >>>    agents MUST support and SHOULD use the Encapsulating
> >> Security Payload
> >>>    (ESP) [6] header in transport mode and MUST use a
> >> non-NULL payload
> >>>    authentication algorithm to provide data origin authentication,
> >>>    connectionless integrity and optional anti-replay
> >> protection.  Note
> >>>    that Authentication Header (AH) [5] is also possible but
> >> for brevity
> >>>    not discussed in this specification.
> >>> -------
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I'm confused, should the draft say
> >>>
> >>> "Both LMA and MAG MUST implement IPsec" and "all the signaling 
> >>> messages SHOULD be protected using IPSec".
> >>>
> >>> Will this ok, when reviewed by the security folks ?
> >>>
> >>> or mandate IPsec for this specification and let other draft
> >> relax this
> >>> in the presence of an alternative approach ?
> >>>
> >>> Please comment.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> Sri
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>  
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: Alper Yegin [mailto:alper.yegin@yegin.org]
> >>>> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2007 1:41 AM
> >>>> To: 'Sri Gundavelli'; netlmm@ietf.org
> >>>> Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> >>>>
> >>>>> The issue was related to the use of MUST clause in
> specifying the
> >>>>> IPSec requirement for Proxy Mobile IPv6 protocol. Alper was 
> >>>>> suggesting that we relax that requirement and
> potentially leave a
> >>>>> room for Auth Option support in future.
> >>>> Actually, I didn't mean it specifically for Auth Option. 
> It can be
> >>>> anything.
> >>>> Given that the security is handled by a separate protocol,
> >> why lock
> >>>> it down to "IPsec", when some other protocol (Auth
> Option being one
> >>>> example) cannot
> >>>> be used.
> >>>>
> >>>>> But, as most people agreed and as supported by Jari, this can
> >>>> My understanding was the opposite, especially about Jari's
> >> statement.
> >>>>> always be changed in future when the support for new security 
> >>>>> mechanisms such as Auth Option are defined for Proxy
> >> Mobile IPv6 and
> >>>>> that specific document can always modify this requirement.
> >>>>> So, no changes will be made to the document on this issue.
> >>>> What if Auth Option is good enough as written?
> >>>> What if a document in another SDO defines the
> alternative security
> >>>> mechanism?
> >>>>
> >>>> For the type of interop we are seeking in IETF, "MUST
> >> implement" is
> >>>> good enough. "MUST use" is not necessary.
> >>>>
> >>>> Alper
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>
> >>>>> Regards
> >>>>> Sri
> >>>>>
> >>>>> _______________________________________________
> >>>>> netlmm mailing list
> >>>>> netlmm@ietf.org
> >>>>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> netlmm mailing list
> >>> netlmm@ietf.org
> >>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> >>
> >> _______________________________________________
> >> netlmm mailing list
> >> netlmm@ietf.org
> >> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> >>
> 
> 
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