RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support

I want some comments on this issue raised by Alper.

Also, if I interpret Sec 5.1 [3775], the IPSec is being
mandated, only the use of IPsec ESP is optional. 

--------
5.1.  Binding Updates to Home Agents

   The mobile node and the home agent MUST use an IPsec security
   association to protect the integrity and authenticity of the Binding
   Updates and Acknowledgements.  Both the mobile nodes and the home
   agents MUST support and SHOULD use the Encapsulating Security Payload
   (ESP) [6] header in transport mode and MUST use a non-NULL payload
   authentication algorithm to provide data origin authentication,
   connectionless integrity and optional anti-replay protection.  Note
   that Authentication Header (AH) [5] is also possible but for brevity
   not discussed in this specification.
-------

I'm confused, should the draft say 

"Both LMA and MAG MUST implement IPsec" and
"all the signaling messages SHOULD be protected using IPSec".

Will this ok, when reviewed by the security folks ?

or mandate IPsec for this specification and let other draft
relax this in the presence of an alternative approach ?

Please comment.

Sri

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Alper Yegin [mailto:alper.yegin@yegin.org] 
> Sent: Tuesday, August 07, 2007 1:41 AM
> To: 'Sri Gundavelli'; netlmm@ietf.org
> Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> 
> > The issue was related to the use of MUST clause in specifying
> > the IPSec requirement for Proxy Mobile IPv6 protocol. Alper
> > was suggesting that we relax that requirement and potentially
> > leave a room for Auth Option support in future.
> 
> Actually, I didn't mean it specifically for Auth Option. It 
> can be anything.
> Given that the security is handled by a separate protocol, 
> why lock it down
> to "IPsec", when some other protocol (Auth Option being one 
> example) cannot
> be used.
> 
> > But, as most people agreed and as supported by Jari, this can
> 
> My understanding was the opposite, especially about Jari's statement.
> 
> > always be changed in future when the support for new security
> > mechanisms such as Auth Option are defined for Proxy Mobile IPv6
> > and that specific document can always modify this requirement.
> > So, no changes will be made to the document on this issue.
> 
> What if Auth Option is good enough as written?
> What if a document in another SDO defines the alternative security
> mechanism?
> 
> For the type of interop we are seeking in IETF, "MUST 
> implement" is good
> enough. "MUST use" is not necessary.
> 
> Alper
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> > 
> > 
> > Regards
> > Sri
> > 
> > _______________________________________________
> > netlmm mailing list
> > netlmm@ietf.org
> > https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm

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