RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support

"Chowdhury, Kuntal" <kchowdhury@starentnetworks.com> Fri, 07 September 2007 22:02 UTC

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Subject: RE: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
Date: Fri, 07 Sep 2007 18:01:32 -0400
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Thread-Topic: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
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From: "Chowdhury, Kuntal" <kchowdhury@starentnetworks.com>
To: Basavaraj Patil <basavaraj.patil@nsn.com>, Sri Gundavelli <sgundave@cisco.com>, Julien Laganier <julien.IETF@laposte.net>, netlmm@ietf.org
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I agree. MUST implement is fine. MUST use is too much, IMO.

-Kuntal


> -----Original Message-----
> From: Basavaraj Patil [mailto:basavaraj.patil@nsn.com]
> Sent: Friday, September 07, 2007 4:56 PM
> To: Sri Gundavelli; 'Julien Laganier'; netlmm@ietf.org
> Subject: Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> 
> 
> To ensure there is interoperability between multiple implementations,
> there
> needs to be a default security mechanism and that would be IPsec. What
> specific method is used in a certain deployment is not mandated by the
> spec.
> 
> So I think we can just leave it as a MUST for IPsec as the default
> security
> solution without saying MUST use.
> 
> -Raj
> 
> 
> On 9/7/07 4:42 PM, "ext Sri Gundavelli" <sgundave@cisco.com> wrote:
> 
> > Raj,
> >
> > This is my view as well. Now, this will conflict with
> > "MUST implement and SHOULD use of IPsec". To be consistent,
> > it has to be "MUST implement and MUST use". Then Alper wont
> > like this...
> >
> >
> > Sri
> >
> >
> >> -----Original Message-----
> >> From: Basavaraj Patil [mailto:basavaraj.patil@nsn.com]
> >> Sent: Friday, September 07, 2007 2:12 PM
> >> To: Sri Gundavelli; 'Julien Laganier'; netlmm@ietf.org
> >> Subject: Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> >>
> >>
> >> Hi Sri,
> >>
> >> I do believe we need to specify a default security mechanism
> >> for the MAG/LMA
> >> signaling messages. And for this purpose, IPsec is a good choice.
> >> So IMO it is required that we state "Proxy MIP6 signaling
> >> messages between
> >> the MAG and LMA MUST be secured by the use of an IPsec SA
> >> between the two
> >> entities".
> >>
> >> I think this does not limit the ability to adopt alternative
security
> >> solutions in the future.
> >>
> >> -Raj
> >>
> >>
> >> On 9/7/07 12:10 PM, "ext Sri Gundavelli" <sgundave@cisco.com>
wrote:
> >>
> >>> Hi Julien,
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>> -----Original Message-----
> >>>> From: julien laganier [mailto:julien.laganier@gmail.com] On
> >>>> Behalf Of Julien Laganier
> >>>> Sent: Friday, September 07, 2007 5:29 AM
> >>>> To: netlmm@ietf.org
> >>>> Cc: Sri Gundavelli; 'Alper Yegin'
> >>>> Subject: Re: [netlmm] Issue: Auth Option support
> >>>>
> >>>> Hi Sri,
> >>>>
> >>>> On Thursday 06 September 2007, Sri Gundavelli wrote:
> >>>>> I'm confused, should the draft say
> >>>>>
> >>>>> "Both LMA and MAG MUST implement IPsec" and
> >>>>> "all the signaling messages SHOULD be protected using IPSec".
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Will this ok, when reviewed by the security folks ?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> or mandate IPsec for this specification and let other draft
> >>>>> relax this in the presence of an alternative approach ?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Please comment.
> >>>>
> >>>> Somehow, "MUST implement" and "SHOULD use" together seems a bit
> >>>> tautologic.
> >>>>
> >>>> To me "SHOULD use" is sufficient since it covers both of the two
> >>>> possibles cases:
> >>>>
> >>>> - deployment follows the SHOULD recommendation, it uses IPsec
> >>>> to protect
> >>>> PMIPv6, in which case it supports it, since it's using it :), or
> >>>>
> >>>> - deployment ignores the SHOULD recommendation, does not uses
> >>>> IPSec, in
> >>>> which case it is useless to implement it since it's not used...
> >>>>
> >>>> I'd prefer having "MUST protect integrity of signalling
> >> messages, and
> >>>> SHOULD use IPsec ESP to protect integrity of those messages".
> >>>> We might
> >>>> also add "MAY use IPsec AH".
> >>>>
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> I agree. I'm not against allowing other approaches. I'm
> >> only concerned,
> >>> if we can leave the draft saying, "MUST protect integrity
> >> of signalling
> >>> messages", with out specifying IPsec or some other approach. If
that
> >>> will pass the security review. We may have to state that
> >> IPsec MUST be
> >>> used or some other approach, say Auth-Option MUST be used.
> >> Not sure, if
> >>> we can leave this blank.
> >>>
> >>> Sri
> >>>
> >>>
> >>> _______________________________________________
> >>> netlmm mailing list
> >>> netlmm@ietf.org
> >>> https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/netlmm
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
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> netlmm@ietf.org
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