Re: [netmod] Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

[Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>]

Hi Qin!

Top posting to say thanks for the updated texted that was added to -15.  It addresses my DISCUSS points.

Regards,
Roman

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Qin Wu <[e-mail]>
> Sent: Saturday, April 25, 2020 11:00 PM
> To: Rob Wilton (rwilton) <[e-mail]>; Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>
> Cc: [e-mail]; Kent Watsen <[e-mail]>; draft-ietf-
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]; The IESG <[e-mail]>
> Subject: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14:
> (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> 
> -----邮件原件-----
> 发件人: Rob Wilton (rwilton) [mailto:[e-mail]]
> 发送时间: 2020年4月25日 0:54
> 收件人: Qin Wu <[e-mail]>; Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>
> 抄送: [e-mail]; Kent Watsen <[e-mail]>; draft-
> [e-mail]; [e-mail]; The IESG
> <[e-mail]>
> 主题: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14:
> (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> 
> Hi Qin,
> 
> This document was discussed today.  I think that Roman plans to follow up
> regarding the security considerations discuss.
> 
> From the discussion today, and reading the Discuss, my understanding is that
> Roman has two concerns that are more about the specific text than the use of
> the template:
> 
> 1) Concerns read access to the factory-default datastore which could contain
> sensitive information.  Perhaps read access to that datastore should default to
> nacm:default-deny-all?  If so, then this should probably be documented in
> section 3, with a sentence in section 6 to explain that is how it is protected.
> 
> [Qin]: Please See Jurgen and Andy's comment in this thread, I agree with Jurgen
> we should treat factory in the same way as running and other datastores. If any
> text is needed, I could add a few text in the section 6 based on the discussion in
> this thread:
> "
> Access to the "factory-reset" RPC operation and factory default values of all
> configuration data nodes within "factory-default" datastore is considered
> sensitive and therefore has been restricted using the "default-deny-all" access
> control defined in [RFC8341].
> "
> 2) The second point is asking to expand this paragraph:
> 
>    The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory
>    default contents varies greatly depending on the implementation and
>    current config.
> 
> Such that the description also covers "Please note that a default configuration
> could be insecure or not have security controls enabled whereby exposing the
> network to compromise."
> 
> [Qin]:So we will see exposing factory default configuration to the network to
> compromise also as one kind of operational disruption, if this is true, here is the
> proposed change:
> OLD TEXT:
> "
>    The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory
>    default contents varies greatly depending on the implementation and
>    current config.
> "
> NEW TEXT:
> "
> The operational disruption caused by setting the config to factory default
> contents or lacking appropriate security control on factory default
> configuration varies greatly depending on the implementation and current
> config.
> "
> If not, please advise.
> 
> I see that you are already addressing the other comments that have been
> raised.
> 
> Regards,
> Rob
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: iesg <[e-mail]> On Behalf Of Qin Wu
> > Sent: 21 April 2020 14:20
> > To: Roman Danyliw <[e-mail]>; The IESG <[e-mail]>
> > Cc: [e-mail]; Kent Watsen <[e-mail]>; draft-
> > [e-mail]; [e-mail]
> > Subject: RE: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on
> > draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-
> > 14: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> >
> > Hi, Roman:
> > A few clarification inline below.
> > -----邮件原件-----
> > 发件人: Roman Danyliw via Datatracker [mailto:[e-mail]]
> > 发送时间: 2020年4月21日 20:52
> > 收件人: The IESG <[e-mail]>
> > 抄送: [e-mail];
> > [e-mail]; [e-mail]; Kent Watsen
> > <[e-mail]>; [e-mail]
> > 主题: Roman Danyliw's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14:
> > (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
> >
> > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for
> > draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default-14: Discuss
> >
> > When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all
> > email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut
> > this introductory paragraph, however.)
> >
> >
> > Please refer to
> > https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html
> > for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions.
> >
> >
> > The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> > https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-netmod-factory-default/
> >
> >
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > DISCUSS:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Please use YANG security considerations template from
> > https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines.
> > Specifically (as a DISCUSS item):
> >
> > ** (Per the template questions “for all YANG modules you must evaluate
> > whether any readable data”) Would factory-default contain any
> > sensitive information in certain network environments where the ACLs
> > should be more restrictive that world readable for everyone?
> > [Qin]: It does follows yang-security-guidelines but there is no
> > readable data node defined within rpc, that's why we don't use third
> > paragraph boilerplate and fourth paragraph boilerplate of yang-security-
> guidelines.
> > YANG-security-guidelines are more applicable to YANG data model with
> > more readable/writable data nodes.
> > In addition, as clarified in the second paragraph, section 6 of this
> > draft, NACM can be used to restrict access for particular NETCONF or
> > RESTCONF users to a preconfigured subset of all available NETCONF or
> > RESTCONF protocol operations (i.e., factory-reset rpc)
> >
> > Per “The operational disruption caused by setting the config to
> > factory default contents varies greatly depending on the
> > implementation and current config”, it seems like it could be worse
> > than just an operational disruption.  Please note that a default
> > configuration could be insecure or not have security controls enabled
> > whereby exposing the network to compromise.
> >
> > [Qin]: As described in the second paragraph of section 6 it by default
> > restrict access for everyone by using the "default-deny-all" access
> > control defined [RFC8341], what else does it need to address this
> > security concern?
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > COMMENT:
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> >
> > Please use YANG security considerations template from
> > https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines.
> > Specifically (as a COMMENT item):
> >
> > ** Add “The Network Configuration Access Control Model (NACM)
> > [RFC8341] provides the means to …”
> >
> > [Qin]: We did follow this template, I am wondering how it is different
> > from the second paragraph of section 6? I see they are equivalent but
> > with more fine granularity security measures, if my understanding is correct.