Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate updates to cover RESTCONF
Benoit Claise <bclaise@cisco.com> Wed, 15 March 2017 16:45 UTC
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To: netmod@ietf.org
References: <20170313212537.GB53972@elstar.local>
From: Benoit Claise <bclaise@cisco.com>
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Date: Wed, 15 Mar 2017 17:45:24 +0100
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Subject: Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate updates to cover RESTCONF
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Dear all, [copying the security ADs to make sure the new security section is fine] Let's separate the two issues 1. the multiple URLs in draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-12.txt Basically, I agree with Jürgen I see section 4.7: This section MUST be patterned after the latest approved template (available athttp://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/ <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/yang-security-guidelines> yang-security-guidelines <http://trac.tools.ietf.org/area/ops/trac/wiki/yang-security-guidelines>).Section 7.1 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-12#section-7.1> contains the security considerations template dated 2013-05-08. Authors MUST check the WEB page at the URL listed above in case there is a more recent version available. Then, I see section 7: The following section contains the security considerations template dated 2010-06-16. Not sure why it contains this cut/paste? It should just say: the latest version is at this URL. Then, I see in the same section: This section MUST be patterned after the latest approved template (available at http://www.ops.ietf.org/netconf/yang-security-considerations.txt This page is not found. This should be corrected in rfc6087bis. 2. the new security guidelines must include RESTCONF. At this point, this is a blocking factor for the publication of YANG module. As an example, draft-ietf-lmap-yang-11 <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lmap-yang/>, A YANG Data Model for LMAP Measurement Agents, on the telechat tomorrow. As mentioned the most up to date version is https://trac.ietf.org/trac/ops/wiki/yang-security-guidelines Here is the proposal, discussed on the YANG doctors list: OLD The YANG module defined in this memo is designed to be accessed via the NETCONF protocol [RFC6241]. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242]. The NETCONF access control model [RFC6536] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF users to a pre-configured subset of all available NETCONF protocol operations and content. NEW The YANG module defined in this memo is designed to be accessed via the NETCONF [RFC6241] or RESTCONF [RFC8040] protocol. The lowest NETCONF layer is the secure transport layer, and mandatory-to-implement is Secure Shell (SSH) [RFC6242], while the lowest RESTCONF layer is HTTP, and the mandatory-to-implement secure transport is Transport Layer Security (TLS) [RFC5246]. The NETCONF access control model [RFC6536] provides the means to restrict access for particular NETCONF or RESTCONF users to a pre-configured subset of all available NETCONF or RESTCONF protocol operations and content. Any objections? Have covered all that we need for the new RESTCONF protocol? Regards, Benoit > Hi, > > this came up during IESG processing of a YANG module - is there a new > security guideline boilerplate text covering RESTCONF? This was > briefly discussed on the yang-doctors but somehow the discussion > stopped because RESTCONF was not published yet at that time. I think > this affects draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-12.txt. > > draft-ietf-netmod-rfc6087bis-12.txt has several pointers to read > online documents - why do we need several points? I think some are > also not working. Ideally, there should be a single stable URL. > > /js >
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Benoit Claise
- [netmod] security considerations boilerplate upda… Juergen Schoenwaelder
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Benoit Claise
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Mehmet Ersue
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Kent Watsen
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Benoit Claise
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Juergen Schoenwaelder
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Benoit Claise
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Juergen Schoenwaelder
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Benoit Claise
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Kent Watsen
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Kent Watsen
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Kathleen Moriarty
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Juergen Schoenwaelder
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Alia Atlas
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Juergen Schoenwaelder
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Benoit Claise
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Kent Watsen
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Phil Shafer
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Ladislav Lhotka
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Kent Watsen
- Re: [netmod] security considerations boilerplate … Acee Lindem (acee)