Re: [netmod] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-revised-datastores-09: (with DISCUSS)

Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 11 January 2018 03:12 UTC

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From: Kathleen Moriarty <kathleen.moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Jan 2018 22:12:02 -0500
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To: Juergen Schoenwaelder <j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de>, Kathleen Moriarty <Kathleen.Moriarty.ietf@gmail.com>, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, draft-ietf-netmod-revised-datastores@ietf.org, Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>, netmod-chairs@ietf.org, netmod@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [netmod] Kathleen Moriarty's Discuss on draft-ietf-netmod-revised-datastores-09: (with DISCUSS)
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Hi Juergen,

Thanks for your quick response.  Inline.

On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 2:45 PM, Juergen Schoenwaelder
<j.schoenwaelder@jacobs-university.de> wrote:
> On Wed, Jan 10, 2018 at 11:21:13AM -0800, Kathleen Moriarty wrote:
>>
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>> DISCUSS:
>> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>> Hello,
>>
>> Thanks for your work on this draft.  I'm a little confused with some text in
>> the draft and have a few questions.
>>
>> 1. The introductions says,
>> "This architectural framework identifies a set of conceptual datastores but
>>    it does not mandate that all network management protocols expose all
>>    these conceptual datastores.  This architecture is agnostic with
>>    regard to the encoding used by network management protocols."
>>
>> As such, the data stores could be exposed for some implementations, using
>> whatever network management protocol (likely NetCONF or RESTCONF).  If this is
>> the case, why doesn't at least some of the security considerations template
>> apply for at least secure transport?
>
> The security considerations text is IMHO correct. The YANG modules defined
> in this document do not define any accessible objects. Hence, the security
> YANG template does not apply.

Could you make that more clear in the document?  The section from the
introduction quoted above says it is possible if network management
protocols expose the datastores.

>
>> 2. Section 5.3.4 - Is there any integrity protection on the origin information?
>>  If not, can it be added or is there a good reason why it’s not possible?  I
>> realize these are conceptual models that may or may not be exposed, but if
>> exposed and used, wouldn’t some integrity protection on this be helpful?
>
> Can you clarify what you mean with 'integrity protection' in this
> context and why you think origin attributes are special? The known
> published network management protocols all use standard security
> protocols (SSH and TLS). In general, security mechanisms are protocol
> specific, I do not see how the architectual definition of datastores
> requires discussion of special integrity mechanisms. Perhaps I do not
> understand your concern.
>

What I'm wondering here and wanted to discuss was really how the
information on origin information will be used.  Does this information
need to be from a source that can be validated?  If so, should there
be some way to provide a MAC for the values for origin information in
the data stores?  I am not referring to transport in this second
question.  Your answer may be an explanation of how the origin
information will be used that excludes any need for integrity
protection.  I just wasn't clear on how the information from the data
stores will be used from the draft.

Thank you,
Kathleen

> /js
>
> --
> Juergen Schoenwaelder           Jacobs University Bremen gGmbH
> Phone: +49 421 200 3587         Campus Ring 1 | 28759 Bremen | Germany
> Fax:   +49 421 200 3103         <http://www.jacobs-university.de/>



-- 

Best regards,
Kathleen