Re: [netmod] x509c2n:cert-to-name problem

Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net> Wed, 30 October 2019 16:56 UTC

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From: Kent Watsen <kent+ietf@watsen.net>
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Date: Wed, 30 Oct 2019 16:56:14 +0000
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Subject: Re: [netmod] x509c2n:cert-to-name problem
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> Ok.  To me this sounds like you need a more complex^wsophisticated
> client identification mechansim than what a plain cert-to-name gives
> you.

I wouldn't characterize it as such.   It's not complex.  It's a simple thing,
optimizing the trivial case for improved usability.  I'm unfamiliar with how
all other models might use cert-to-name, though one use is here [1], but
I imagine all uses that are associated with a TLS connection also wishing
for this optimization (this includes [1]).  For models that are not associated
with a TLS connection, the current cert-to-name 'mandatory true' is just
fine.

[1] https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7407#section-2.12 <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7407#section-2.12>


> I don't think there is anything wrong with the current
> cert-to-name grouping.  

See above.


> So let's continue this discussion in the
> netconf ML, where this model is being developed.

I'll fork this part of the conversation there.


Kent // contributor