Re: [nfsv4] Martin Duke's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)

Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Wed, 08 July 2020 05:27 UTC

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Date: Tue, 7 Jul 2020 22:27:47 -0700
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: Martin Duke <martin.h.duke@gmail.com>
Cc: The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, davenoveck@gmail.com, draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls@ietf.org, nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org, nfsv4@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Martin Duke's Discuss on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: (with DISCUSS and COMMENT)
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On Thu, Jun 25, 2020 at 01:56:10PM -0700, Martin Duke via Datatracker wrote:
> Martin Duke has entered the following ballot position for
> draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls-08: Discuss
> 
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> The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here:
> https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpc-tls/
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> 
> 
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> DISCUSS:
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> This presumably a trivial fix but I think it's important enough to be a DISCUSS:
> 
> I think the document needs some discussion of the security properties of TLS1.3
> early data over TCP, if only to refer to Section 8 of RFC 8446 (replay) and
> mention that it is not forward-secure, unlike the rest of the payload.

I actually think that the situation is well-defined without such additional
text -- Appendix E.5 notes that:

   Application protocols MUST NOT use 0-RTT data without a profile that
   defines its use.  That profile needs to identify which messages or
   interactions are safe to use with 0-RTT and how to handle the
   situation when the server rejects 0-RTT and falls back to 1-RTT.

Since this document does not provide such a profile, early data MUST NOT be
used, and there's no need to say more.

-Ben