Re: [nfsv4] Potential erratta for RFC7931

David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com> Mon, 03 October 2016 23:21 UTC

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From: David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 03 Oct 2016 19:21:18 -0400
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To: Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org>
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Cc: Bill Baker <bill.baker@oracle.com>, "nfsv4@ietf.org" <nfsv4@ietf.org>
Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Potential erratta for RFC7931
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> Nit: I believe your argument was that one repeat was sufficient. > If that's
the case, let's say that.

Good point.  See the replacement paragraph below

> And the bottom of p. 24 also needs an update: "Note also that
> the callback update procedure can be repeated multiple times
> to reduce the probability of further spurious matches."

That's already within the replaced paragraph.

The new proposed replacement paragraph is as follows:

Although the NFSv4.0 specification requires the server to make sure that
such verifiers are very unlikely to be regenerated, different servers may
use the same approach to the construction of such verifiers, raising the
probability that two distinct servers might inadvertently assign the same
verifier value. The fact that the servers in question have assigned the
same clientid4 may raise this probability.  In order to guard against the
possibility that such assignments might cause two distinct

servers to be incorrectly considered the same, the SETCLIENTID procedure
mentioned above needs to be repeated at least once.  Repeating the
procedure once  is
sufficient to ensure that the successive confirm values SCn, SCn'
 generated by these repeated SETCLIENTID operations cannot all collide with
a verifier previously received by the client when communicating with IPn.


On Mon, Oct 3, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> wrote:

> On Sat, Oct 01, 2016 at 09:02:52AM -0400, David Noveck wrote:
> > Although the NFSv4.0 specification requires the server to make sure that
> > such verifiers are very unlikely to be regenerated, different servers may
> > use the same approach to the construction of such verifiers, raising the
> > probability that two distinct servers might inadvertently assign the same
> > verifier value. The fact that the servers in question have assigned the
> > same clientid4 may raise this probability.  In order to guard against the
> > possibility that such assignments might cause two distinct
> >
> > servers to be incorrectly considered the same, the SETCLIENTID procedure
> > mentioned above needs to be repeated at least once.
>
> Nit: I believe your argument was that one repeat was sufficient.  If
> that's the case, let's say that.
>
> And the bottom of p. 24 also needs an update: "Note also that the
> callback update procedure can be repeated multiple times to reduce the
> probability of further spurious matches."
>
> I'd update it to something like: "The callback update procedure must
> then be repeated one more time".
>
> > This will ensure that
> > the sucessive confirm values SCn, SCn'. SCn'' generated by these repeated
> > SETCLIENTID operations cannot all collide with a verifier previously
> > received by the client when communicating with IPn.
> >
> > Comments?
>
> I think that's correct, and it's a minimal change, and therefore maybe
> it's the right thing for errata.
>
> It bugs me that the only client I've looked at does something different
> and much simpler.
>
> After receiving the SETCLIENTID with a clientid matching an established
> one, the modified RFC7931 requires, if I have it right:
>
>         1. SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM to the new server.
>         2. SETCLIENTID to the old server.
>         3. SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM to the new server.  And with this fix:
>         4. SETCLIENTID to the old server.
>         5. SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM to the new server.
>
> Whereas the Linux client needs only:
>
>         1. SETCLIENTID_CONFIRM to the old server.
>
> And that works just as well.  (The existing Linux client has the same
> bug, but that is fixed with just a single if statement and no more
> round trips.)
>
> So at some point I'd hope we can document this, as 1) it's actually
> being used by a major client so people need to know about it, 2) it's
> easier to implement and analyze.
>
> --b.
>