Re: [nfsv4] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcrdma-cm-pvt-data-06

Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com> Thu, 30 January 2020 16:28 UTC

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Date: Thu, 30 Jan 2020 18:28:45 +0200
From: Yaron Sheffer <yaronf.ietf@gmail.com>
To: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
CC: secdir@ietf.org, last-call@ietf.org, nfsv4@ietf.org, draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcrdma-cm-pvt-data.all@ietf.org
Message-ID: <335110AE-F983-4151-8CEB-6C06586176BD@gmail.com>
Thread-Topic: [nfsv4] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcrdma-cm-pvt-data-06
References: <158007038921.30641.13334124837519126164@ietfa.amsl.com> <80F557DD-BD17-4119-98B9-614B7A9FDDFB@oracle.com> <85F5B476-8720-488B-9262-CBA9B322BFD3@gmail.com> <DA051FCB-F042-46B8-95C3-19E764023A48@oracle.com>
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Secdir last call review of draft-ietf-nfsv4-rpcrdma-cm-pvt-data-06
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Looks good. Thank you very much!

	Yaron

On 1/30/20, 17:10, "Chuck Lever" <chuck.lever@oracle.com> wrote:

    Hello Yaron-
    
    The Security Considerations section now reads as follows:
    
    6.  Security Considerations
    
       The reader is directed to the Security Considerations section of
       [RFC8166] for background and further discussion.
    
       The RPC-over-RDMA version 1 protocol framework depends on the
       semantics of the Reliable Connected (RC) queue pair (QP) type, as
       defined in Section 9.7.7 of [IBA].  The integrity of CM Private Data
       and the authenticity of its source are ensured by the exclusive use
       of RC queue pairs.  Any attempt to interfere with or hijack data in
       transit on an RC connection results in the RDMA provider terminating
       the connection.
    
       Additional analysis of RDMA transport security appears in the
       Security Considerations section of [RFC5042].  That document
       recommends IPsec as the default transport layer security solution.
       When deployed with iWARP, IPsec establishes a protected channel
       before any iWARP operations are exchanged, thus it protects the
       exchange of Private Data that occurs as each QP is established.
       However, IPsec is not available for InfiniBand or RoCE deployments.
       Those fabrics rely on physical security and cyclic redundancy checks
       to protect network traffic.
    
       Improperly setting one of the fields in a version 1 Private Message
       can result in an increased risk of disconnection (i.e., self-imposed
       Denial of Service).  There is no additional risk of exposing upper-
       layer payloads after exchanging the Private Message format defined in
       the current document.
    
       In addition to describing the structure of a new format version, any
       document that extends the Private Data format described in the
       current document must discuss security considerations of new data
       items exchanged between connection peers.
    
    
    --
    Chuck Lever