Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5661sesqui-msns-03: (with COMMENT)
Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> Thu, 09 January 2020 23:57 UTC
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Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2020 15:57:04 -0800
From: Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
To: David Noveck <davenoveck@gmail.com>
Cc: Roman Danyliw <rdd@cert.org>, draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5661sesqui-msns@ietf.org, The IESG <iesg@ietf.org>, NFSv4 <nfsv4@ietf.org>, nfsv4-chairs@ietf.org
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Subject: Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5661sesqui-msns-03: (with COMMENT)
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On Sun, Jan 05, 2020 at 11:51:56AM -0500, David Noveck wrote: > On Sat, Jan 4, 2020, 2:02 AM Benjamin Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> wrote: > > > On Thu, Jan 02, 2020 at 10:29:06AM -0500, David Noveck wrote: > > > On Tue, Dec 17, 2019 at 9:05 PM Roman Danyliw via Datatracker < > > > noreply@ietf.org> wrote: > > > > > > > Roman Danyliw has entered the following ballot position for > > > > draft-ietf-nfsv4-rfc5661sesqui-msns-03: No Objection > > > > > > [...] > > > > > > > > ** Section 21, Per “When DNS is used to convert server names to > > addresses > > > > and > > > > DNSSEC [29] is not available, the validity of the network addresses > > > > returned > > > > cannot be relied upon.”, this concern about the fidelity of the DNS > > > > information > > > > is a helpful consideration. It would be worth mentioning/recommending > > the > > > > use > > > > of other DNS technologies such as DNS over TLS [RFC7858] and DNS over > > HTTPS > > > > [RFC8484] that could provide additional/alternatives confidence > > mechanisms > > > > in > > > > the DNS data. > > > > > > > > Will add. > > > > > > Could revise that bullet to read as follows: > > > > > > o When DNS is used to convert server names to addresses and none of > > > DNSSEC [30], DNS over TLS [31], and DNS over HTTPS [35] are > > > available, the validity of the network addresses returned cannot > > > be relied upon. However, when the client uses RPCSEC_GSS to > > > access the designated server, it is possible for mutual > > > authentication to discover invalid server addresses provided, as > > > long as the RPCSEC_GSS implementation used does not use insecure > > > DNS queries to canonicalize the hostname components of the service > > > principal names, as explained in [29]. > > > > This is a fairly subtle area, and it's pretty hard to write something > > that's 100% accurate. > > > It looks like what I came up with is 60% accurate at best. > > Specifically > > > , it's still possible for the returned > > network addresses to still be unreliable even when DoT or DoH are used > > (though they do provide significant protection over traditional > > DNS-on-port-53). This all comes back to DNS resolution (generally) being a > > multi-stage process, with stub resolver talking to recursive talking to > > authority. Only the authority is, well, authoritative for the returned > > results (addresses), and the only end-to-end way to provide authentication > > for the results is DNSSEC. But, DoT and DoH provide integrity protection > > for the stub-to-recursive leg (in current usage; in theory they can also be > > used from recursive to authority), and when the recursive is trusted, that > > combines to provide trust in the returned addresses even if there is not > > necessarily cryptographic protection between recursive and authority. [more > > discussion of various attacks and the subtle differences in provided > > protection elilded]. > > > > So, my suggestion would be a different approach, along the lines of: > > > > % o When DNS is used to convert server names to addresses and DNSSEC > > % [29] is not available, the validity of the network addresses > > % returned generally cannot be relied upon, though when combined with a > > % trusted resolver, DNS over TLS [31] and DNS over HTTPS [35] can also > > % provide resolved addresses in a reliable manner. However, when the > > % [...] > > > > How about the following, which is based on your treatment above? It > divides the discussion into two paragraphs: one about DNS result validity > and the other about steps to deal with the possibility of invalidity: > > - When DNS is used to convert server names to addresses and DNSSEC [29] > is not available, the validity of the network addresses returned generally > cannot be relied upon. However, when combined with a trusted resolver, DNS > over TLS [31] and DNS over HTTPS [35] can also be relied upon to provide > valid address resolutions. > > In situations in which the validity of the provided addresses cannot be > relied upon and the client uses RPCSEC_GSS to access the designated server, > it is possible for mutual authentication to discover invalid server > addresses as long as the RPCSEC_GSS implementation used does not use > insecure DNS queries to canonicalize the hostname components of the service > principal names, as explained in [29]. That all looks good; thanks for applying a nice wordsmithing touch! -Ben
- [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft-iet… Roman Danyliw via Datatracker
- Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft… David Noveck
- Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft… David Noveck
- Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft… Benjamin Kaduk
- Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft… David Noveck
- Re: [nfsv4] Roman Danyliw's No Objection on draft… Benjamin Kaduk