[nfsv4] Stephen Farrell's No Objection on draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion2-40: (with COMMENT)

["Stephen Farrell" <[e-mail]>]

Stephen Farrell has entered the following ballot position for
draft-ietf-nfsv4-minorversion2-40: No Objection

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COMMENT:
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- 1.3.2: I'm just curious, feel free to ignore. Does anyone
maintain those posix specs these days? (e.g.
[posix_fadvise]).

- 1.4: "a new arm" isn't clear to this reader, maybe
consider re-phrasing if this isn't a common NFS term (if it
is, that's fine)

- 4.10: thanks for providing all that!

- 4.10: possibly dumb question: does this (or NFSv4) support
what a user would perceive as an encrypting file system
where the keys are held-by/derived from something on the
user's machine? If so, and if the two servers involved use
keys known at the user's machine and not by the NFS
infrastructure then I'm not sure how this can work. IOW, if
there's a decryption and then a re-encryption required in a
server-server copy and if that needs any keying material
from the client then could that ever work? Note that I'm not
talking about securing the file during the server-server
copy but de-crypting before sending and then re-encrypting
before storing.

- 9.6: Is it considered a requirement that e.g. a user
cleared to secret cannot tell if there is anything stored
that is of higher classification? If so, did anyone go
through all NFS interfaces to check if e.g. disk or
directory usage information could give away the fact that
there is stuff stored that's not visible to this user?  I'm
not arguing that this definitely needs to be done
exhaustively, but maybe consider adding a caveat emptor
sentence somewhere saying that even with MAC, it could be
that NFS allows for some minor meta-data leakage such as the
above.